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Strategic Idealizations of Science to Oppose 
Environmental Regulation: A Case Study of Five 
TMDL Controversies 
David S. Caudill∗ & Donald E. Curley∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturing uncertainty and promoting inappropriate criteria for 
assessing the quality of evidence . . . are central elements of a strategy 
for opposing regulation, impeding discussion of values and societal 
priorities, and closing out input from those whose health and quality of 
life are impacted by regulatory decisions.1 
The accusation has become commonplace—regulated parties derail, 
delay, and weaken governmental efforts to protect public health and the 
environment by employing a series of questionable strategies to attack 
the scientific evidence behind such efforts.  Proponents of environmental 
regulation have catalogued those strategies as including (1) 
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 1. Polly J. Hoppin & Richard Clapp, Science and Regulation: Current Impasse and Future 
Solutions, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S8, S8 (Supp. 1, 2005). 
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manufacturing or magnifying uncertainty;2 (2) demanding “sound 
science” (and thereby imposing unreasonable standards of evidence);3 
and (3) data quality initiatives that permit deconstruction of credible 
studies by highlighting inevitable assumptions, funding sources, and 
areas for further research.4  Such strategies can be termed “idealizations” 
of science insofar as they rely on an unrealistic image of good science as 
somehow capable of avoiding tentative conclusions, institutional 
interests, consensual assumptions, and the need for further research. 
One might reasonably ask how such strategies could ever work, 
given our familiarity with (1) regulatory science’s frequent probabilistic 
reasoning, uncertainties, genuine disputes, imperfect assessments, 
insufficient resources, and incomplete data, as well as (2) scientists’ 
respective theoretical commitments, experimental conventions, research 
expectations, rhetorical advocacy, and affiliational interests.5  There is, 
however, an obvious cultural authority enjoyed by science and scientists, 
and our reliance on scientific progress and utility leads naturally to some 
level of idealization.6  More to the point, there is also evidence that 
strategies based upon an idealization of science do “work” in legal 
contexts.7  Trial judges who romanticize science’s capacity to resolve 
legal disputes may sometimes reject credible evidence because an expert 
concedes the pragmatic limitations and uncertainties of her conclusion; at 
other times, they admit flawed evidence solely on the basis of the 
expert’s confidence and credentials.8  In the regulatory context, the 
                                                          
 2. See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT 
ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008).  See also David Michaels & Celeste Monforten, 
Manufacturing Uncertainty: Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and 
Environment, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S39 (Supp. 1, 2005) (noting that those against public health 
and environmental regulation sometimes manufacture uncertainty by doubting the scientific 
evidence on which the regulatory entities rely). 
 3. See generally Roni A. Neff & Lynn R. Goldman, Regulatory Parallels to Daubert: 
Stakeholder Influence, “Sound Science,” and the Delayed Adoption of Health-Protective Standards, 
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S81 (Supp. 1, 2005) (discussing how pressures for excessive review, 
documentation, and “sound science” are used to impose unreasonable standards of evidence in health 
regulation). 
 4. See generally Wendy Wagner, The Perils of Relying on Interested Parties to Evaluate 
Scientific Quality, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S99 (Supp. 1, 2005) (discussing how sound science can 
appear controversial when individual methodological decisions are challenged). 
 5. See DAVID S. CAUDILL & LEWIS H. LARUE, NO MAGIC WAND: THE IDEALIZATION OF 
SCIENCE IN LAW 104–19 (2006) (discussing generally the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects 
of scientific practice as distinguished from the core elements of science including hypothesis, data 
collection, testing, publication and peer review, and application (or, in the alternative, refutation and 
revision)). 
 6. See id. at 36–41. 
 7. See id. at 2, 31–44.  Also see the examples offered in Michaels & Monforten, supra note 2; 
Neff & Goldman, supra note 3; Wagner, supra note 4. 
 8. See CAUDILL & LARUE, supra note 5, at 15–28, 31–36. 
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Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) recent failure to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions was arguably due to the EPA Administrator’s 
invocation of the scientific uncertainties concerning the causal link 
between greenhouse gas emission and global warming.9  The question 
remains, however, when does an argument based on scientific 
uncertainty reflect a valid concern, and when is such an argument merely 
strategic? 
This Article is based on a study that was structured to identify 
whether and how arguments and challenges based on idealizations of 
science are used in the initial (pre-litigation) stages of local water quality 
controversies.  Based upon the geographic location, research interests, 
and previous professional experiences of the authors, we decided to 
focus on the scientific disputes that followed from five Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TMDLs)10 recently issued to pollutant dischargers with 
                                                          
 9. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Petitioners claimed that the 
“refusal to regulate rested entirely on scientific uncertainty”; the court disagreed, referring to “many 
‘policy’ considerations that . . . warranted . . . forbearance,” including risk assessment), rev’d, 127 S. 
Ct. 1438 (2007).  In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that the EPA cannot “avoid its 
statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and 
concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this time.”  127 S. Ct. at 1444.  Of 
course, the role of politics and the Bush administration’s environmental agenda, which reflects a 
cautious approach to regulation (e.g., more study), should not be overlooked.  The asserted 
uncertainties likely do not alone explain the EPA’s decision to forego regulation. 
 10. The term “load” in TMDL refers to the amount of an identified pollutant discharged into an 
impaired body of water; the “maximum” is the amount beyond which a previously designated water 
quality standard cannot be attained, and that amount is allocated to the sources of the pollutant.  See 
Clean Water Act, 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(e)–(f) (2007).  The Clean Water Act distinguishes between 
point and nonpoint sources of pollution, such that a TMDL for a particular pollutant is the sum of the 
wasteload allocation (WLA) from point sources, the load allocation (LA) from nonpoint sources, 
natural background levels, an allocation for future growth, and a margin of safety.  See id. § 
130.2(g)–(i).  “Point source” refers to pipes, ditches, channels, wells, discrete fissures, containers, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operations, and even floating vessels from which 
pollutants are discharged.  See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (14) (2000).  By contrast, a 
“nonpoint source” is a source of pollution without a single point of origin, and generally refers to 
diffuse runoff, typically caused by rainfall or snow melting; pollutants may result, for example, from 
agricultural activities, or from commercial and residential development, including roads and parking 
lots.  See Edward B. Witte & David P. Ross, Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, in THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT HANDBOOK 193 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003).  “The definition of nonpoint source 
pollution in the Clean Water Act . . . does not exist . . . . [A]nything that is not a point source and yet 
conveys pollutants to our nation’s waters is a nonpoint source.”  Id. at 192–93.  However, the 
classification of stormwater runoff as a point source, and regulation of industry and municipal 
stormwater systems under NPDES permits, see OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE USER’S GUIDE 297–300 (2d ed. 2001) (providing an overview of point 
sources), introduces some confusion.  For example, the Wissahickon TMDL analyzed in this study 
was both a point source and a nonpoint source TMDL, but sediment loads from stormwater were 
considered point sources.  See WISSAHICKON CREEK TMDL, infra note 110; see also 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Total Daily Maximum Loads, http://www.dep.state.pa.us 
/watermanagement_apps/tmdl/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2008) (providing information on 
Pennsylvania TMDLs). 
While TMDLs for point source discharges are relatively straightforward, “the current regulatory 
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respect to impaired waters in the Philadelphia area.  From March 1, 
2007, to November 30, 2007, we collected and examined documents 
related to the five TMDLs, including, as to each TMDL, its respective 
modeling reports, public comments and agency responses, technical 
supporting documents, and initial legal challenges (including appeals, 
motions, and briefs).  To supplement our understanding of the disputes, 
we also interviewed various EPA and Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection (PaDEP) officials, private attorneys 
representing local stakeholders, scientists, representatives of advocacy 
groups, and university professors with expert knowledge of the TMDL 
program.  The purpose of this Article is to describe the results of our 
study, including our sense that idealized arguments, at least in the early 
stages of TMDL disputes, are not very effective. 
Briefly, the TMDL program is a cooperative effort between federal 
and state environmental agencies with origins in the Clean Water Act, 
which regulates water pollution to protect U.S. water resources (e.g., 
lakes and streams), maintain aquatic life, and preserve recreational 
uses.11  The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
in the Act provides for discharge permits,12 as well as procedures for 
states to establish TMDLs for pollutants in their impaired waters, 
including listing of polluted waters, ranking of priorities, identifying 
pollution loads for safety, and taking steps to reduce point and nonpoint 
loadings to that level.13  As to discharge permits, the 1972 amendments 
                                                                                                                       
framework does not adequately provide for the control of nonpoint source pollution . . . .  There are 
limited technical controls that can be applied to the sources, even if the sources can be easily 
identified.”  Witte & Ross, supra, at 192.  In another formulation, “whereas point sources are subject 
to well-defined standards of control technology and strict numerical limits, nonpoint source 
regulation is a picked-over smorgasbord of studying, planning, and promises of federal money to pay 
for the studying and planning.”  Josh Clemons, Addressing Nonpoint Source Pollution in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits: Could Pronsolino Happen in Mississippi and Alabama?, 21 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 55, 56 (2005). 
 11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387.  The 1948 Water Pollution Control Act was focused on state 
efforts, and the 1965 revisions required states to develop water quality standards by 1967.  The 1972 
Clean Water Act was the result of major amendments to the Water Pollution Control Act, including 
enforceability by the EPA (created in 1970).  See JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER 
ACT 5–8 (2005).  For a recent history of the Clean Water Act, see PAUL CHARLES MILAZZO, 
UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: CONGRESS AND CLEAN WATER, 1945–1972 (2006).  The use of 
science in the TMDL program begins with the setting of water quality standards since the “TMDL 
process is primarily a measurement process” to achieve a specific criterion for a specific, designated 
use.  See COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD 
APPROACH TO WATER POLLUTION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH 
TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 7–8 (2001).  Listing impaired waters is also science intensive, 
but in this study we focus on the use of science in the development of TMDLs and in the initial or 
early scientific challenges thereto by stakeholders.  See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 12. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)–(b). 
 13. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
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to the Clean Water Act envisioned uniform, national technology-based 
(i.e., not based on water quality) standards to limit effluent discharges by 
industries.14  As to TMDLs, the 1972 amendments also envisioned a 
water-quality-based program in which the states each (1) adopt water 
quality standards necessary for various uses (e.g., public water supply, 
recreational, etc.) that define what counts as impaired in the 
identification, listing, and prioritization of impaired waters, and (2) 
establish the TMDL for identified pollutants15 “necessary to implement 
the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a 
margin of safety . . . .”16  However, “state and federal officials have 
begun to implement [the TMDL process] in earnest only recently, and 
much of that effort was a response to forty lawsuits that had been filed 
against the EPA.  [In 2005, TMDLs had] been set for only a small 
fraction of impaired waters.”17  Significantly, even when pollutant 
dischargers are in full compliance with their permits, states must identify 
and prioritize impaired waters, prepare TMDLs for each pollutant, and 
submit the lists and TMDLs to the EPA for approval (or disapproval, in 
which case the EPA must prepare its own list and TMDLs).18  Finally, 
states must provide for public review of their TMDLs and incorporate 
their TMDLs into their water quality management program.19 
Because our study focused on conventional TMDLs recently 
promulgated in eastern Pennsylvania,20 the ongoing controversies 
                                                          
 14. See GROSS & DODGE, supra note 11, at 8–9, 25–46. 
 15. See id. at 47–48. 
 16. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). 
 17. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 11, at 54.  For 29,711 waters identified to the EPA as 
impaired, there were 11,408 TMDLs promulgated as of May 2005.  Id.  “The extent of TMDL 
promulgation varies widely by state.”  Id. (There were 1780 reported impairments in Minnesota as of 
May 2005, but only twenty-five TMDLs; in contrast, Kansas had 2308 TMDLs for 2623 
impairments).  For an update and critical assessment of state TMDL efforts, see generally Kelly 
Seaburg, Murky Waters: Courts Should Hold that the “Any-Progress-Is-Sufficient-Progress” 
Approach to TMDL Development Under Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act Is Arbitrary and 
Capricious, 82 WASH L. REV. 767, 772–776 (2007) (explaining the mandatory requirements the 
Clean Water Act has imposed on the EPA and states for TMDL development). 
Regarding the “forty lawsuits,” see Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths That Threaten the 
TMDL Program, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,133, 11,133 (2002) (describing the 1978 court order forcing 
the EPA to identify TMDL pollutants, various citizen suits forcing the EPA to require states to 
submit TMDLs, and the litigation forcing the EPA to deal with minimal state TMDL submissions 
either by working with the state to encourage compliance or by making its own TMDL list). 
 18. Laurie K. Beale & Karin Sheldon, TMDLs: Section 303(d), in THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 205, 207 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d); 40 C.F.R. 1 §§ 130.2(j), 
130.7(b)(4), 130.7(c)(1), 130.7(d)(1)–(2)). 
 19. Id. at 207–08 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.5–6, 130.7(C)(1)(ii) & 
(d)(2)). 
 20. In a state-of-readiness survey by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) regarding 
TMDLs, “[forty] states reported confidence in their ability to identify point sources of pollution (not 
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surrounding the TMDL program—including TMDLs for agriculture21 
and pollutant trading schemes22—are beyond the scope of this Article.  
However, it bears mentioning that the issues of the “soundness” of 
TMDL science, the challenge of scientific uncertainties, and the effect of 
political and economic interests on science have been part of the national 
TMDL controversy.  In July 1999, during the last years of the Clinton 
administration, the EPA issued its draft of a comprehensive TMDL 
regulation23 to improve pollution control by focusing on nonpoint 
sources.  The opposition was overwhelming—a perfect storm of anti-
government and anti-Clinton sentiments, state concerns about resources 
and funding, industry complaints, House and Senate hearings receptive 
to critics, and even (as the proposal was watered down with concessions) 
criticism by environmental groups.24  Upon issuance of the final TMDL 
rules in July 2000,25 the EPA was “left without a single, unified 
constituency” as well as “a rule nobody liked.”26  Congress delayed 
application of the rule by way of an appropriations rider until October 
2001,27 and the controversy continued until the rule’s effective date was 
delayed until March 2003;28 eventually it was withdrawn.29 
                                                                                                                       
that hard a trick, given that point source loadings are characterized in each NPDES permit) . . . while 
[twenty-nine] states felt they had sufficient data to develop point source TMDLs.”  Oliver A. Houck, 
The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,385, 10,390 
(2002) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER QUALITY: KEY EPA AND STATE DECISIONS 
LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE DATA 43–44 fig.7 (2000)). 
 21. See Clemons, supra note 10, at 56; see also William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—
Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 543, 564 (2004). 
 22. See Ann Powers, The Current Controversy Regarding TMDLs: Pollutant Trading, 4 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 9 (2003). 
 23.  Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulations, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 46,012 (Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130).  In 1998, President Clinton 
“announced his administration’s Clean Water Action Plan to protect and restore the nation’s waters.”  
FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.03[2][a-2], 3-107 (Matthew Bender & 
Co., Inc. 2002) (citing 63 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (Mar. 24, 1998) (entitled “Notice of Availability of 
Clean Water Action Plan”)).  “Without undercutting the established emphasis of the 1972 Clean 
Water Act on effluent limitations of point sources, the new plan expand[ed] the interpretation of 
statutory authorizations by focusing on nonpoint sources, such as runoff from urban and agricultural 
lands and facilities . . . .”  Id. at 3-108. 
 24. See Houck, supra note 20, at 10,386–88. 
 25. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation . . ., 65 Fed. Reg. 
43,586 (July 13, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).  Nonpoint sources are 
explicitly included in TMDL framework.  Id. at 43,588.  TMDLs must be scheduled for 
promulgation within ten years.  Id. at 43,591.  Further, states must provide an implementation plan 
and assurance that TMDL goals will be met.  Id. 
 26. Houck, supra note 20, at 10,388. 
 27. H.R. 4425, 106th Cong. (2000) (prohibiting the EPA from spending money to implement 
the rule, and mandating a study by the National Academy of Science on the adequacy of TMDL 
science). 
 28. Delay of Effective Date of Revisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,817–22 (Aug. 9, 2001) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).   
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Identification of pollutants and reduction through controlling 
discharges at their source might seem relatively straightforward from a 
scientific perspective, but scientific controversies abound in the TMDL 
context.  Identifying sources (including point source and nonpoint 
sources) is difficult, as is measuring pollutants, understanding how much 
of a pollutant can be “handled” by difficult-to-understand aquatic 
ecosystems, and determining downstream and upstream effects.  
Moreover, the scientific issues of identifying an impaired water at the 
preliminary stage, including arguments about whether a water is 
impaired, are different from the issues at the TMDL stage when the state 
(or the EPA) is in a remedial mode.  This latter stage includes arguments 
about whether the TMDL will be effective in alleviating an 
acknowledged problem.  Our focus in this study is on the TMDL stage 
(although stakeholder comments criticizing a TMDL often criticize the 
original impairment listing as questionable), where the scientific burden 
of proof may be effectively lower than it is at the earlier “listing” stage.  
In the earlier stage, states are not obligated to make an impairment 
finding if the evidence is inconclusive on whether a particular lake or 
stream fails to meet the state’s water quality standards.  Science-based 
challenges to impairment findings, therefore, may not need to be strong 
or precise to prevent listing.  By contrast, after an impairment finding, 
establishing TMDLs for relevant pollutants (a single body of water may 
be subject to multiple TMDLs) is mandatory, and that legal obligation 
may affect administrative and judicial demands concerning the quality of 
the science supporting a TMDL.  If TMDLs must be established with 
available or easily obtained science, then science-based arguments may 
need to be particularly strong and precise by offering more data, studies, 
alternative methodologies and models, or uncertainty analyses, rather 
than simply demanding them.  The reasonableness or legitimacy of 
science-based demands for more study and data, and for less uncertainty,  
 
                                                                                                                       
Regarding the final TMDL rules: 
The July 2000 rule was extremely controversial.  The agency had received more than 
34,000 comments on the proposed TMDL rule. . . . 
  More than a dozen groups, including farm groups, environmental groups, municipal 
wastewater treatment officials, and state water pollution agencies, filed challenges to the 
revised TMDL rule. . . .  The current rule remains in effect . . . . 
CHRISTOPHER L. BELL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 323 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 
19th ed. 2007). 
 29. Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 68 
Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 124, 130).  For 
detailed accounts of the controversy over the July 2000 rule, see generally Houck, supra note 20; 
Malone, supra note 17. 
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depends upon the context of regulation; we selected a context (TMDL 
disputes) characterized by legal compulsion and urgency.30 
Criticism of existing “TMDL science” was a centerpiece throughout 
the controversy over revising and strengthening the TMDL program: 
There [was] a broad consensus of support among stakeholders for the 
use of . . . “good science.”  However, there [was] a significant 
difference of opinion, particularly between environmental activists and 
the regulated community, over exactly what constitutes good science.  
There [was] also concern by the regulated community that the 
development and implementation of [new] regulations may precede the 
development of appropriate scientific methods.31 
At a hearing in March 2000, on the proposed TMDL revisions, an 
environmentalist attorney testified, “[w]e cannot afford to wait for 
perfect data and a perfect understanding of the interaction between 
pollutants and the aquatic ecosystem before taking steps to correct  
 
 
                                                          
 30. The compulsive nature of TMDL implementation makes “adaptive implementation” (AI) an 
attractive alternative to most current TMDL programs: 
The central theory of AI is that uncertainty can be reduced over time only by studying 
and/or modeling watershed and water quality responses to load reductions, implementing 
controls, and then carefully and methodically assessing the results in order to learn while 
doing.  The learning would be incorporated into improved modeling and/or analysis that 
would, in turn, lead to more informed decision making. 
LEONARD SHABMAN ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR THE ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS AT DUKE UNIV., 
ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PLANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CHALLENGES 10 (2007), available at http://nicholas.duke.edu/institute/adaptive-water.pdf.  Indeed, 
AI has been proposed to overcome the types of controversies that are the subject of this study: 
A TMDL implementation plan that ignores uncertainty and the cost of error can often 
generate stakeholder disagreements and difficulty in moving forward with a TMDL plan.  
Some, citing uncertainty and possible costs of “overspending” on controls, argue for 
more study.  Others, seeing the same uncertainty and concerned about being “protective 
of water quality,” argue for even more stringent [margins of safety] (with [their] attendant 
costs).  Meanwhile, disputes could arise over the scope of regulatory authorities . . . and 
the adequacy of the financial resources to implement the plan.  The result is often 
stalemate, legal action, and delay in implementing any water quality improvements.  
Adaptive decision-making approaches are well-suited to breaking the deadlock and 
promoting consensus among disputing parties. 
Id. at 38–39.  While the potential for AI (and existing applications in some states) is beyond the 
scope of this study, our findings are consistent with the above assessment and therefore make the 
foregoing argument more compelling. 
 31. Donald Galya et al., EPA’s New Water Quality Initiative: Issues for Stakeholders, 13 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 562, 564 (1999).  Due to states’ lack of both funding for a “state-of-the-
science approach” and a “large resource base with scientific and regulatory skills,” their agencies 
“may tend to use less resource intensive, and less scientifically appropriate, approaches.”  Id. at 565. 
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serious water pollution problems.”32  Later that year, Congressman Allen 
Boyd (Second District of Florida) released “TMDL 101” for the press: 
The truth is that TMDL rules are fundamentally flawed.  Independent 
scientific reviews of the rules have confirmed criticism by the National 
Academy of Science’s National Research Council that EPA’s science 
does not support its decision-making. . . .  I am a cosponsor of [a bill 
that would] require that the science be peer-reviewed. . . . [L]et’s make 
sure that our data [are] accurate and our science is sound before 
imposing rules that could have drastic implications on the many 
Americans whose livelihood are at stake.33 
The National Research Council report (to which Boyd refers) is 
somewhat ambivalent; on the one hand, it seems suspicious of 
[t]he call for “sound science” in the TMDL program. . . . By definition, 
science is [a] process of continuing inquiry.  Thus, calls to make policy 
decisions based on “the science,” or calls to wait until “the science is 
complete,” reflect a misunderstanding of science.  Decisions . . . must 
be made, based on a preponderance of evidence . . . .34 
On the other hand, the report identified large gaps in TMDL data 
(especially with regard to nonpoint sources), recommended increased 
monitoring to produce accurate sampling and reduce uncertainty, and 
stated that many state water quality standards are flawed.35  Thus TMDL 
science is neither worthless nor perfect, but somewhere in between, and 
the debate over its sufficiency for making regulatory decisions will 
continue.  While we do not purport in this Article to bring closure to that 
                                                          
 32. Proposed Revisions to EPA Water Quality Regulations (TMDLs): Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) 
(statement of Richard A. Parrish, Southern Environmental Law Center). 
 33. Press Release, Congressman Allen Boyd (2d Dist. Fla.), TMDL 101 (Oct. 13, 2000), 
available at http://www.house.gov/boyd/br101300.html.  The stakes involve not only expensive 
control equipment upgrades, but also the threat of shutting down industrial facilities. 
 34. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 89.  In Houck’s view, “On one level, the 
NAS report is an affirmation of the TMDL program.  The message on the adequacy of the 
supporting science was blunt: the science is there, its uncertainty can be reduced, and uncertainties 
that remain should not be used as an excuse for delay or inaction.”  Houck, supra note 20, at 10,391. 
 35. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5, 32–38, 81–82, 90 (discussed in Houck, 
supra note 20, at 10,391).  Interestingly, Houck considers the National Research Council’s TMDL 
assessment to be “a rush job” by a “small group with an attitude.”  Houck, supra note 20, at 10,392.  
For example, the National Research Council report states the authors’ preference for state over 
federal responsibility is not an assessment of scientific adequacy, but is “taking sides in a political 
debate over federalism.”  Id.  “Under normal circumstances, NAS reports are written over several 
years, by scientists with little financial or political connection to the issues before them, and with a 
balance of points of view.”  Id.; see also id. at 10,393 (suggesting the TMDL panel chair was an 
industry witness with an agenda, and that the report’s principal author was already critical of the 
TMDL program). 
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debate, we do hope to illuminate the issue of uncertainty in regulation by 
bracketing off the abstract and generalized political discourse and 
focusing in on the early stages of a few actual controversies within the 
TMDL program. 
The enormous complexity of the TMDL program,36 pitting strict 
statutory demands against limited state resources as well as potentially 
high costs of industry compliance, ends up highlighting the pragmatic 
limitations and uncertainties of science in law: 
The Achilles’ heel of water quality standards-based regulation has 
always been the difficulty of ascribing and quantifying environmental 
effects for particular discharge sources.  There is always another 
possible source, or another possible reason that . . . fish . . . are dying.  
There is always an arguable threshold level for pollutants that may not 
harm fish . . . . And when we come to more complex biological impacts 
such as the fate and effects of nutrients . . . downstream, we are beyond 
any pretense of precise mathematics for cause and effect decisions. . . . 
“Good Science” . . . does not mean precision; it means the best science 
can do at the time.37 
Many scientific challenges to TMDLs are surely valid; it is reasonable to 
demand that underlying calculations “be rationally derived from the best 
available data,” but to require more—“the hypertechnical, isolated, 
cause-and-effect kinds of proof”—is unrealistic.  “If proof of that kind is 
required, TMDLs will never get off the ground.  Science, in this area of 
the law, will never deliver precision.”38  But where is the line between a 
                                                          
 36. As of May 2005, almost 30,000 impaired waters were identified to the EPA by states, many 
with multiple pollutants.  See GROSS & DODGE, supra note 11, at 54; see also Memorandum from 
Benjamin H. Grumbles, Asst. Adm’r, EPA, to EPA Directors, Establishing TMDL “Daily” Loads in 
Light of the Decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. EPA, et al., No. 05-5015, (Apr. 25, 2006) and Implications, for NPDES Permits (Nov. 15, 2006) 
(“[M]ore than 20,000 TMDLs have been established . . . .  EPA’s database also shows that 
approximately 65,000 causes of impairment still need to be addressed by TMDLs.”). 
 37. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 58–59 (2d ed. 2002).  Significantly, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 
1313(d)(1)(C), requires that TMDLs “be established at a level necessary to implement the applicable 
water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which takes into account any 
lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality.”  In a 
stronger formulation: 
Uncertainty must be explicitly acknowledged both in the models selected to develop 
TMDLs and in the results generated by those models.  Prediction uncertainty must be 
estimated in a rigorous way, models must be selected and rejected on the basis of a 
prediction error criterion, and guidance/software needs to be developed to support 
uncertainty analysis. 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 10. 
 38. See HOUCK, supra note 37, at 59.  “Scientific uncertainty is a reality within all water quality 
programs, including the TMDL program, that cannot be entirely eliminated. . . .  Securing designated 
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reasonable demand for reliable scientific data and an unreasonable 
demand for certainty?  Given the variations in sampling and reporting 
methods among the states, and the perceived need of states for “every 
manner of technical assistance from monitoring to assessment to 
enforcement” in order to comply with the TMDL program, it did not 
seem unreasonable when, for example, the Association of Metropolitan 
Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) published a survival guide for wastewater 
agencies that included, as a strategy, challenging in court an impaired 
water listing by demanding “sufficient reliable scientific data.”39  On the 
other hand, public “environmental law . . . is precautionary, and that 
precaution requires taking science beyond the dispositive to the 
reasonable.”40  From that perspective, the AMSA survival guide appears 
to be “a litigator’s cookbook to identify . . . methods of limiting or 
avoiding responsibility.”41  As mentioned above, however, the challenge 
to an impaired water listing (as the AMSA guide recommended) is a 
different context than a TMDL challenge—the demand for “sufficient 
                                                                                                                       
uses is limited . . . by . . . unreasonable expectations for predictive certainty among regulators, 
affected sources, and stakeholders.”  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 4 (emphasis 
omitted).  Even beyond the water quality context, “pervasive uncertainty in a variety of dimensions 
is regularly cited as a defining characteristic of environmental problems.”  Holly Doremus, Data 
Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. 
L.J. 407, 446 (2008).  As Professor Doremus explains: 
Demanding perfection of scientific information is a recipe for paralysis by analysis. . . .  
Managers must evaluate, to the best of their ability, the likelihood of obtaining desired 
scientific information at a reasonable cost within a reasonable time frame.  Decisions 
about how to handle uncertainty should take into account the reducibility or irreducibility 
of that uncertainty, as well as the risks and costs of various types of error. 
Id. 
 39. See HOUCK, supra note 37, at 138–40 (citing AMSA, Evaluating TMDLs . . . Protecting the 
Rights of [Publicly Owned Treatment Works]).  As noted by Houck: 
  The states and TMDL-implicated communities . . . are alert to . . . weaknesses in 
monitoring and assessment and have already signaled their willingness to exploit 
them. . . .  Opposing listings as based on inadequate science (“drive-by listings,” in the 
words of one agriculture industry attorney—a characterization that in some cases may not 
be far from the truth), farm and other nonpoint interests have persuaded states to reduce 
their submissions on impaired waters to the absolutely proven, with significant results.  
Incongruous as it may seem in the face of new EPA listing criteria designed to be all-
inclusive, to err on the side of listing, and to facilitate the use of “all relevant data,” many 
states have actually cut their § 303(d) lists in half since 1996, relegating hundreds of 
waters to such categories as “further study,” “insufficient information,” and only 
“moderately impaired.” 
Id. at 138.  But see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5 (“Many [listed impaired] 
waters . . . were placed there without the benefit of adequate water quality standards, data, or 
waterbody assessment. . . .  States should be allowed to move those waters . . . back to a preliminary 
list.”). 
 40. HOUCK, supra note 37, at 140. 
 41. Id. at 139–40.  For an extensive discussion of the precautionary principle and its 
relationship(s) with science, see generally Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While 
Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 547–67 (2007). 
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reliable scientific data” may well be more reasonable at the listing stage, 
where states have discretion with respect to water quality standards and 
assessments of waters thereunder, than at the TMDL stage, when states 
are compelled to act quickly to correct an acknowledged impairment.  
One of the purposes of our study of local TMDL controversies, apart 
from, but central to, our inquiry as to whether and how idealized 
scientific arguments are strategically used to challenge regulation, was to 
identify the contours or characteristics, respectively, of reasonable 
scientific arguments and those arguments that rest on unrealistic 
scientific expectations in the TMDL context.  We recognize that our 
judgments in this regard are inevitably normative and possibly 
controversial; others may not draw the same boundaries as we did, but 
we are confident the discourse concerning unreasonable scientific 
standards will be enhanced by evaluating actual arguments made in the 
early stages of actual TMDL controversies.  Furthermore, our emphasis 
was more on the form of arguments than their content; we did not seek to 
referee the scientific arguments or declare right from wrong.  Finally, we 
acknowledged that the use of idealized arguments is not limited to 
industry stakeholders, but is available to either side in an environmental 
dispute.  Environmentalists can potentially demand too much—for 
example, too conservative a margin of safety, or too much certainty 
regarding reduction of pollutants. 
Our effort to identify and analyze idealized arguments, albeit 
empirical, falls on the side of qualitative rather than quantitative 
evidence.42  We considered coding our data in numerical terms for 
statistical analysis, but the small sample of TMDL controversies—
especially their variation in terms of how and when the TMDLs were 
challenged, the number of interested parties involved in challenges 
(including dischargers such as municipalities or industry, as well as 
environmentalist groups), the types of relevant documents, the number of 
arguments made in those documents, and the subjects interviewed 
without formal surveys—rendered quantitative analysis meaningless.  
The nuances were such that there would be too many categories for too 
few examples.43  As a means to capture those nuances, however, and not 
                                                          
 42. “The word ‘empirical’ denotes evidence about the world based on observation or 
experience.  That evidence can be numerical (quantitative) or nonnumerical (qualitative); neither is 
any more ‘empirical’ than the other.”  Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (citation omitted). 
 43. Because we were engaged in content analysis of documents, which often combines 
qualitative and quantitative methodology by coding the appearance of particular “contents” 
according to a set of categories, we could have expressed our results in terms of statistical frequency 
(of types of arguments), but our sample was so small that such results would be misleading.  See 
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as a “second best” (to the quantitative) approach, we used semi-
structured interviews and textual analysis, typical of qualitative 
methodology, to collect data.44  We are aware of the substantial 
controversies concerning appropriate methodologies for empirical legal 
scholarship—some claim “rigorous” quantitative empirical methodology 
is superior to qualitative or theoretical inquiries,45 while others associated 
with “discourse analysis, cultural studies, feminism[,] and postmodern 
schools of thought”46 emphasize the limitations of quantitative 
approaches in numerous settings.47  In this Article, we attempt to make 
explicit our assumptions and our category development for coding the 
data in our study, and to thereby demonstrate the basis for our qualitative 
interpretations.48  For example, we modified our initial definitions of 
idealized arguments once we began reviewing relevant documents and 
interviewing interested parties.49 
In Part II, we describe the structure of our study in detail, identifying 
our hypothesis, initial methodological issues and limitations, data 
collection techniques, and coding categories.  Part III is a summary of 
our database of approximately forty technical and scientific arguments in 
the five TMDL disputes under analysis.  The results of our study are 
discussed in Part IV, and we also consider several implications of the 
study, including policy considerations regarding the TMDL program 
                                                                                                                       
generally RUSSEL A. JONES, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 121–
32 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing content analysis, coding, and sampling). 
 44. See Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Law, Sociology, and Method, in THEORY AND METHOD 
IN SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH 1, 14 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2005). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 23–24 (“[In Great Britain,] the quest for finding ways of revitalizing 
empirical legal research comes at a time when . . . socio-legal research is at the height of its 
academic popularity and success.  This implies that ‘rigorous’ research is other than the type of 
research (mainly of the qualitative interpretive kind) currently undertaken by most socio-legal 
researchers in the UK.”). 
 46. Reza Banakar & Max Travers, Introduction, in THEORY AND METHOD IN SOCIO-LEGAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 44, at xii. 
 47. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the 
Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567 (2007) (expressing concern over quantitative studies of judicial 
ideology). 
 48. See JONES, supra note 43, at 121–22 (“Content analysis as a research technique goes 
beyond normal reading and viewing habits . . . in requiring that you be explicit about the criteria you 
apply in deciding what a text contains and the rules by which you have applied those criteria.  ‘Being 
explicit’ means making it possible for another person to apply precisely the same criteria in precisely 
the same manner, and that when they do, they should arrive at precisely the same conclusions about 
the text in question.”). 
 49. See LAWRENCE T. ORCHER, CONDUCTING RESEARCH: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 
METHODS 41 (2005) (“[Q]ualitative research does not need to be as fully planned in advance and 
deviations in the plans can not only be tolerated but might be welcomed as well.  For instance, semi-
structured interviews might be used to gather qualitative data.  The interviewers might be 
encouraged to probe in different directions . . . . [and] the responses of early respondents might lead 
to modifications in the questions asked of later participants . . . .”). 
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generally.  We conclude in Part V that while idealized scientific 
arguments recur with some frequency early in TMDL disputes, they do 
not seem to be particularly effective at that stage in delaying or 
weakening state and federal efforts to improve water quality. 
II. STRUCTURE OF THE CASE STUDY 
The well-known metaphor of the ‘dialogue’ between Method and 
Nature portrays an ideal communicative situation with fixed roles and 
functions.  The Method puts the questions, Nature offers its 
answers. . . . 
There is, though, another possible scenario, where a real dialogue 
takes place, within a community of scientists.  Here, . . . .  Nature is the 
actual object of a dispute, rather than being one of its fictitious 
disputants.  “Dialogue,”—far from suggesting an idealized ritual—
means here actual discussion, debate, controversy, or conflict.50 
A. Background 
In response to the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public 
Policy’s (SKAPP’s) 2006 request for grant proposals, we submitted an 
initial contact letter describing our proposed study of the use and 
manipulation of idealized views of science in the TMDL program.  We 
were then invited to submit a full proposal, which was provisionally 
approved subject to (1) our providing evidence of cooperation from 
participants in the subject TMDL controversies, and (2) our providing a 
description of how we would distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonable scientific objections in the relevant documents.  The 
Institutional Review Board at our home institution, Villanova University, 
also requested an explanation of how the notion of idealized arguments 
could be “operationalized” in an empirical study. 
We initially defined “idealized arguments” as those scientific 
challenges that employed (1) unrealistically high standards for science,51 
                                                          
 50. Eleonora Montuschi, Review, 45 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 375, 379 (1994) (reviewing 
PERSUADING SCIENCE: THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC RHETORIC (M. Pera & W.R. Shea eds., 1991)). 
 51. See, e.g., Neff & Goldman, supra note 3, at S81 (“There is broad agreement that regulatory 
decisions about the environment, safety, and health should be based on evidence.  But pressures for 
ever-increasing documentation, review, and ‘sound science’ have been used to create unreasonable 
standards of evidence, interfering with the government’s task of protecting the public.”); see also 
Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the “Junk Science” Law: Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 37, 41 n.7 (2006) (discussing the Information (or “Data”) Quality Act of 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-154 (2000) (guidelines to ensure accurate data)).  
Sound science initiatives include not only increased demands for data quality and integrity but also 
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(2) claims of uncertainty if able to be characterized as unreasonable 
demands for certainty,52 and (3) claims that an opponent’s science is 
interested (e.g., that it is politically or economically biased).53  Our 
premise was that while science generally involves some level of 
uncertainty, often relies on models based on assumptions and limited 
data, and is typically funded from a source with some “interest,” those 
aspects do not signal unreliability in the same way substantial flaws in 
data collection, data interpretation, or methodology might.  In short, we 
were prepared to look for idealized strategies in several local 
environmental disputes; our hypothesis (based on environmentalist 
literature) was that such strategies were indeed used to avoid, delay, or 
weaken TMDLs. 
Because we were not confident about where we might find, if at all, 
evidence of idealizing strategies, we proposed an initial study of one 
TMDL controversy, looking at the relevant documents (concerning 
scientific, not legal, disputes) and interviewing regulators and interested 
parties.  Our goal was to adopt procedures for efficiently studying the 
remaining TMDLs identified as objects of the study. 
The five TMDLs we considered were selected because they were the 
only local TMDLs challenged by stakeholders on scientific grounds.  
They otherwise involved various pollutants.  While all were the subject 
of formal appeals to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, 
either the TMDLs were withdrawn (two TMDLs) or the appeals were 
                                                                                                                       
preferences for empirical, field-tested, and peer reviewed data.  See Chris Mooney, Sucker Punch: 
How Conservatives are Trying to Use a Conflict over Obscure Fish to Gut the Science Behind the 
Endangered Species Act, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2004, at 24.  However, in endangered species 
protection, for example: 
[Some scientists] [r]ead [such] language as a stealthy attempt to ban . . . reliable 
techniques . . . [such as] population modeling, which projects current data into the future 
and is thus neither exclusively empirical nor field-tested (though the initial data has to 
come from the field). . . .  “If you’re going to say, ‘we can’t use models,’ you might as 
well shut down the scientific enterprise.” 
Id. (quoting biologist Gordon Orians, University of Washington). 
 52. See Michaels & Monforten, supra note 2, at S41 (listing examples of “manufactured” 
uncertainty by the lead, chemical, and asbestos industries). 
 53. We identify claims of interest as idealized because the mere affiliation of a scientist with an 
interest group does not signal scientific invalidity: 
Interest, it seems, is in the eye of the beholder.  Those concerned with regulatory 
abuse . . . refer to those who have been the recipients of generous grants from the 
EPA . . . as biased or interested scientists. . . .  From the opposite perspective, it is the use 
of [outside] interest groups to review the quality of the science within agencies that 
presents the greater challenge[,] . . . as if interest groups do not rely on legitimate 
science[;] . . .  [In this latter perspective,] “adversarial challenges” [are] the opposite of 
“expert consensus,” [and] scientists are never adversarial. 
David S. Caudill, Images of Expertise: Converging Discourses on the Use and Abuse of Science in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 185, 203–05 (2007). 
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withdrawn (three TMDLs).  Our goal was not to explore generally how 
draft TMDLs were created—neither initially, in negotiated settlements, 
nor through litigation—but rather to determine whether and how parties 
challenged the science leading up to the final TMDLs.  We planned to 
examine, for the initial (and each subsequent) TMDL, its “load” 
requirements for the subject pollutant, the agency’s technical support 
documents, public comments on the draft TMDL, any appeals, the 
technical supporting documents for any appeal, and the results of any 
appeal.  We also planned to supplement our understanding and analysis 
of documents by interviewing state and federal TMDL supervisors and 
technical support personnel, as well as stakeholders and litigants 
(including representatives of municipal and industry dischargers as well 
as environmental groups), and their technical advisors.  Significantly, we 
recognized that our initial categories of “idealized arguments” might be 
rejected or modified, and that new categories might be identified. 
B. Methodological Issues 
In our attempt to distinguish idealized arguments from reasonable 
and justifiable ones, we acknowledged that a challenge on the basis of 
excessive uncertainty, inadequate data, or inappropriate modeling is not 
necessarily an idealized argument.  Genuine scientific evaluation can 
proceed on the basis that the data is wrong or incomplete (e.g., gaps in 
the data), or by highlighting questionable assumptions, conflicts of 
interest, and flaws or errors in the technical supporting documents and 
models.  Nevertheless, we attempted to identify unreasonably high 
standards and unrealistic demands for certainty or disinterestedness, and 
we understood such strategies would not be acknowledged or clearly 
visible in TMDL challenges. 
Constructing a definition of an idealized, unreasonable, or too 
demanding argument turned out to be very difficult.  Having identified 
some arguments that seemed idealized to us, we realized we were 
evaluating arguments within a particular and narrow context, namely the 
interactions between stakeholders and regulators just before and just after 
a TMDL is finalized.  In a different context, an argument that seems 
unreasonable (in response to a TMDL) might be quite appropriate.  For 
example, peer review of a scientific report is a conventional demand 
prior to publication in a scientific journal and an appropriate post-
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. “factor” in judicial 
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evaluations of reliability and admissibility.54  But in the context of 
statutorily-mandated and perhaps rushed regulation to reduce water 
pollution, such a demand might be unrealistic.55  Similarly, conducting a 
formal uncertainty analysis as part of TMDL modeling, rather than 
simply using a ten percent margin of safety, would improve the 
reliability of the results;56 demanding that level of reliability does not 
seem unreasonable to a stakeholder facing an expensive modification to  
 
 
                                                          
 54. See 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (noting “factors [that] bear on the inquiry” into the 
reliability of scientific testimony include testability, low error rate, peer review or publication, and 
“general acceptance”). 
 55. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2006) (detailing how mandatory, rigorous, and inflexible peer review adds high 
demand on agency resources).  This has the potential to drain resources from other decision-making 
components and also has the potential to impede decision-making overall.  Id. 
 56. Telephone Interview with Ken Reckow, Professor, Department of Environment and Earth 
Studies, Duke University (Sept. 5, 2007) (discussing how ambiguities in TMDL regulation are likely 
of concern to the regulated community; one study indicated that 171 of 172 subject TMDLs did not 
contain formal uncertainty analyses; some modelers have developed methods of formal uncertainty 
analysis, but these have not achieved widespread implementation); see also PAUL L. FREEDMAN ET 
AL., WATER ENV’T RES. FOUND., NAVIGATING THE TMDL PROCESS: EVALUATION AND 
IMPROVEMENTS (2003) (providing a review of 176 TMDLs, of which 103 specified a margin of 
safety (102 of which were arbitrarily selected, and one of which was based on a calculation of 
uncertainty), 56 implied a margin of safety, and 17 used no margin of safety or were unclear whether 
a margin of safety was used); Mark E. Borsuk et al., Predicting the Frequency of Water Quality 
Standard Violations: A Probabilistic Approach for TMDL Development, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 
2109, 2114 (2002) (Limited samples to infer water quality characteristics introduce uncertainty, and 
current TMDL models under-represent the dynamics of the system; authors propose a probabilistic 
approach to enhance prediction of standard violations).  The authors explain: 
[T]he common practice, when attempting to use complex simulation models for decision 
support, [is to select] the margin of safety using arbitrary safety factors or conservative 
model assumptions.  However, such a practice obscures the underlying basis for the 
margin of safety and amounts to making decisions ‘in the dark.’  If, on the other hand, a 
formal uncertainty analysis is performed, in which model results are expressed as the 
degree of confidence that a standard will be met for any given pollutant loading level, 
then decision-makers simply need to choose the percent reduction that corresponds to 
their desired level of confidence. 
Id. at 2114.  For a similar analysis, see Vladimir Novotny, Simplified Databased Total Maximum 
Daily Loads, or the World is Log-Normal, 130 J. ENVTL. ENG’G. 674 (2004).  See also David W. 
Dilks & Paul L. Freedman, Improved Consideration of the Margin of Safety in Total Maximum Daily 
Load Development, 130 J. ENVTL. ENG’G. 690, 690–91 (2004) (“[T]he margin of safety component 
of TMDLs is not being addressed rigorously in most TMDLs currently being developed . . . and . . . 
the approaches currently used vary widely (and arbitrarily) on a site-specific basis. . . .  [The 
problems are] (1) limited practical experience in defining the uncertainty in the TMDL calculations; 
(2) absence of information regarding the degree of protection provided by the margin of safety; and 
(3) data-poor/high-uncertainty situations that can result in MOS values so large as to make 
implementation impractical. . . . [because] most stakeholders . . . will demand that extensive 
pollution control efforts be based upon scientific understanding gained from a sufficient amount of 
site-specific data.”). 
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meet new discharge criteria.57  Yet is it reasonable in the context of 
urgently needed TMDL implementation? 
The question concerning appropriate methodologies in various 
contexts was raised by Professor J.B. Ruhl in a recent article focused on 
endangered species protection.58  Ruhl contrasts the “Scientific Method” 
he associates with rigorous burdens of proof, probing peer reviews, and 
strong data, with the Professional Judgment Method that “prevails in 
administrative law”: 
Where the costs of the Scientific Method are not justified, or the data 
needed to complete it are unavailable, we might feel comfortable 
relying on experts in fields relevant to the subject matter of the 
decision, whose experience and expertise we believe will allow them 
confidently to fill in the gaps that prevent competent use of the 
Scientific Method.59 
Ruhl also equates the Professional Judgment Method to the 
conventional standard of review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act:60 “considerable deference to the agency’s decision,” but a probing 
review to ensure that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise unlawful.61  The decision is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency relies on inappropriate factors, fails to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offers a justification running counter 
to the evidence or that is implausible, or fails to articulate a rational 
explanation for its action.62  “Put simply,” Ruhl concludes, “the agency 
has failed to exercise properly its professional judgment . . . .”63  The 
implication is that the Scientific Method, “which would render 
                                                          
 57. For example, Smithfield Beef Group complained that the Skippack Creek TMDL would 
require an estimated $150,000 capital expenditure and $75,000 annual costs to comply.  EPA, 
COMMENT RESPONSE DOCUMENT FOR THE SKIPPACK CREEK TMDL, 6, cmt. 02-01 (Apr. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter SKIPPACK COMMENTS/RESPONSES].  The EPA’s response was that costs of 
implementation are not considered.  Id. 
 58. See J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 
559 (2004). 
 59. Id.  “[M]any decisions [under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 
(2006)] involve questions of biological science for which the available scientific database is either 
sparse or inconclusive.  By demanding that the agencies nonetheless reach conclusions under strict 
deadlines, the [Act] sets up a methodological quandary.”  Id. at 560. 
 60. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“[T]he reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law [or] . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing . . . .”). 
 61. Ruhl, supra note 58, at 578 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 415 (1971) (referring to a “thorough, probing, in-depth review”)). 
 62. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 63. Id. 
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[Endangered Species Act] decision-making more like [a] Ph.D. 
dissertation defense[],”64 is not the appropriate standard. 
The tension highlighted by Ruhl is not between science and 
something else, such as mere opinion, as Ruhl’s contrast of “professional 
judgment” with “scientific method,” or my brief summation of his views, 
might suggest.  Science is, in the abstract, the foundation for 
environmental regulation, but the reality is that science comes in many 
forms.  Ruhl and others have spoken in terms of levels of confidence,65 
and while “sloppy, filtered, or haphazard evidence” is not enough to 
withstand judicial review,66 something short of the “very high level of 
confidence” associated with the “norms of research science” seems 
appropriate for environmental regulation.67  This framework has been 
described as balancing “the epistemic objective against relevant non-
epistemic objectives” in governmental fact-finding: 
The epistemic objective is to produce findings of fact that are as 
accurate as possible and that are warranted by the evidence legally 
available to the factfinder.  The non-epistemic objectives include . . . 
administrative efficiency . . . [and] public health . . . . [, which] 
influence . . . what standard of proof the factfinder should use in 
selecting a finding . . . .68 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 560–61. 
 65. See id. at 555 (“One basis on which we might choose how to go about making decisions is 
the level of confidence we wish decisions to enjoy.”); see also Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, 
Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES 
L. REV. 1 (2005). 
Environmental law is . . . indebted to science . . . both as the justification for 
environmental law and as the means for fairly administering it. 
. . . . 
  . . . Unless science can provide some level of confidence that management actions are 
both necessary and effective, those decisions will be widely perceived as unfair.  The key 
question, not yet answered, is just how much confidence should be expected. 
Id. at 1–2; see also Borsuk et al., supra note 56, at 2114 (noting that decision makers need to 
determine their desired level of confidence and choose percent reductions that directly correspond). 
 66. Ruhl, supra note 58, at 582. 
 67. See Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s 
Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 439 (2004) [hereinafter Doremus, The Purposes, 
Effects, and Future]. 
 68. Vern R. Walker, Epistemic and Non-epistemic Aspects of the Factfinding Process in Law, 5 
J. PHIL., SCI. & L. 1, 1–2 (Mar. 2005). 
Factfinding in law is always pragmatic, in the sense that it always occurs in a context in 
which governmental action is at stake. . . . 
  The epistemic objective . . . is to ensure that the factfinder will be accurate . . . .  But 
the factfinding process cannot be divorced from the pragmatic context in which it 
occurs . . . .  The non-epistemic objectives therefore influence . . . when the factfinder 
should be allowed to find that the available evidence “adequately supports” a finding . . . . 
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In the context of endangered species protection, for example, 
“[w]hen faced with uncertain data, we must decide how much certainty 
to require—that is, what level of confidence we want to have in our 
decision—before altering the status quo.  The question essentially is 
what burden of proof we want to impose on the wildlife agencies.”69  The 
issue of the “burden of proof” on agencies, as contrasted with the burden 
of proof on those challenging regulations, became important for our 
definition of an idealized scientific argument on the part of a stakeholder 
challenging a TMDL.  Specifically, when is it unreasonable to demand 
more certainty in TMDL science? 
While the conventional framework for judicial review of federal 
agency actions combines (1) a burden on the challenger to demonstrate 
an error,70 with (2) judicial deference to agency discretion (“narrow” 
standard of review; presumption of validity),71 there is, in the context of 
challenges to science-based regulation, a corresponding (1) burden on the 
agency to justify its decision, combined with (2) a “searching and 
careful” judicial inquiry into the agency’s findings of fact.72  Whether the 
agency’s burden is called a burden of proof, or simply a requirement to 
meet “a specific threshold level of scientific information to support 
regulatory decisions” (including “the appropriate level of scientific  
 
                                                                                                                       
Id. at 1–2. 
 69. Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future, supra note 67, at 439. 
 70. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. Against Interstate Route 675 v. Lewis, 542 F. Supp. 496, 521 
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (noting that in order to overturn an agency decision, plaintiffs must show the 
“decision was a ‘clear error of judgment’”); Chung v. Park, 377 F. Supp. 524, 530 (M.D. Pa. 1974) 
(declaring “[t]he placement of the burden of production on [the challenger] did not deprive [the 
challenger] of ‘due process’”), aff’d, 514 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 71. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865, 869 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“The APA’s 
standard of review is narrow and presumes that agency action is valid . . . .”); United Elec., Radio & 
Mach. Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that an agency decision is 
only revised “if the record is ‘so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail’ to disagree” 
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992))). 
 72. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  Thus in the 
“Benzene” opinion, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the 
burden was on OSHA “to show, on the basis of substantial evidence, that it is at least more likely 
than not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of benzene presents a significant risk of material health 
impairment.”  448 U.S. 607, 653.  “OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant risk 
exists with anything approaching scientific certainty.  Although the Agency’s findings must be 
supported by substantial evidence, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f), § 6(b)(5) specifically allows the Secretary to 
regulate on the basis of the ‘best available evidence.’”  Id. at 656.  Whether the “best available 
evidence” standard adds any higher burden on an agency is not clear.  See Ruhl, supra note 58, at 
582; see also Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 65, at 6 (noting it is not clear that science mandates 
add any additional level of constraint).  Nevertheless, “even in the absence of any explicitly 
legislative scientific mandate[s],” today’s “ordinary APA review requires that agencies provide some 
scientific justification for highly technical decisions.”  Id. at 4. 
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certainty or caution”),73 agencies must justify their science,74 offer 
adequate reasons for their decisions,75 and produce evidence.76 
Under Pennsylvania’s Administrative Agency Law, by comparison, 
findings of fact made by an agency also must be supported by substantial 
evidence.77  The “arbitrary and capricious” standard does not appear in 
the Pennsylvania Act, but does appear in judicial opinions under the 
Act,78 along with the “presumption that the actions of public officials are 
within the limits of their discretion.”79  In a PaDEP environmental action 
appeal to the Environmental Hearing Board, the appellant bears the 
burden of proof80 but an agency must support its findings with substantial 
evidence.81  Upon judicial review of a Board decision, findings of fact 
                                                          
 73. Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future, supra note 67, at 416. 
 74. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the EPA had to explain how they took seasonal variations into account, produce evidence to support 
a ten percent margin of safety, and show that allowing the state to use aesthetic water quality 
standards to formulate TMDLs for phosphorus in waterbodies was not arbitrary and capricious). 
 75. See Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
some of EPA’s listings of metal smelting wastes as hazardous were based on reasoned decision-
making, but some were not).  Agency actions can also be reversed if the agency failed to consider 
substantial arguments or respond to relevant and significant comments in an agency proceeding.  See 
ABA, A BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2004). 
 76. See Sierra Club, 939 F. Supp. at 869–72 (holding in a summary judgment action, moving 
party can meet its burden by showing the agency has no evidence to support its position; at that point 
the burden shifts to the agency). 
 77. 2 PA CONS. STAT. § 704 (2008). 
 78. See Deane v. Bd. of Adjustment of Zoning Bd. of Borough of Edgeworth, 94 A.2d 112, 114 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1953) (recognizing that arbitrary and capricious actions will be reversed); Cardiac 
Science, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Gen. Servs., 808 A.2d 1029, 1033 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (“‘Courts will 
not review the action of governmental bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion 
in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action, or abuse of power.’” (quoting Kimmel v. Lower 
Paxton Twp., 633 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993))).  Significantly, “some commentators 
would agree that [it] is unclear whether ‘arbitrary and capricious’ actually means anything different 
than ‘substantial evidence.’”  Jerry Mashaw, Legal Control of Administrative Policymaking: The 
“Judicial Review Game”, reprinted in PETER SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
242 (2d ed. 2004). 
 79. Snelling v. Dep’t. of Transp., 366 A.2d 1298, 1304 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). 
 80. See 25 PA. CODE § 1021.122(c) (2006) (“A party appealing an action of the Department 
shall have the burden of proof  . . .: (1) When the Department denies a license, permit, approval or 
certification.  (2) When a party who is not the recipient of an action by the Department protests the 
action.  (3) When a party to whom a permit approval or certification is issued protests. . . .”).  
Interestingly, the PaDEP regulations no longer state that a challenger of a TMDL has the burden of 
proof to show that the TMDL does not meet requirements.  See Law of July 1, 1933, 25 PA. CODE § 
96(4)(L) (repealed 1937); see also 30 Pa. Bull. 5913, 6068 (Nov. 18, 2000) (“The proposed 
subsection (1), placing the burden of proof on a person who challenges a TMDL, is deleted in 
response to comments.”); Telephone Interview with Martha Blasberg, Supervisory Counsel, PaDEP 
(Feb. 13, 2007) (stating it is likely PaDEP would take the position that the burdens are the same); 
Berks County v. Dep’t Envtl. Prot., 894 A.2d 183, 191 (Pa. Commw. 2006) (acknowledging that a 
party protesting issuance of a permit has the burden of proof to show issuance was arbitrary or an 
abuse of discretion), appeal denied, 907 A.2d 1104 (Pa. 2006). 
 81. Smedleh v. PaDEP articulated the Board’s standard for de novo review as “whether the 
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must be supported by substantial evidence.82  There is precedent for the 
notion that the Board shifts the burden of proof to PaDEP once 
“credible” expert scientific evidence shows PaDEP’s actions have a 
negative effect on the environment,83 but this is arguably misleading.84  
Only the “burden of going forward with the evidence” shifts, that is, the 
burden of production.85  In any event, a regulatory action by PaDEP will 
require substantial supporting evidence to withstand judicial review. 
This brief foray into standards of review in administrative law, the 
complexities of which are far beyond the scope of this article,86 is 
necessitated by the question of what types of scientific arguments should 
be considered unreasonable or too demanding in the context of TMDLs.  
Consider the EPA’s own 2002 TWENTY NEEDS REPORT: HOW 
RESEARCH CAN IMPROVE THE TMDL PROGRAM,87 which recommends 
improving the scientific quality of existing TMDLs, analytical modeling, 
uncertainty analysis (calculated instead of using subjective margins of 
safety), monitoring programs, and water quality standards (numeric 
rather than narrative).88  Although the report “does not represent or 
modify EPA’s TMDL program policy or guidance and is limited to 
                                                                                                                       
findings upon which the DEP based its actions are correct and whether DEP’s action is reasonable 
and appropriate and otherwise in conformance with the law.”  Adjudication at 30, No. 97-253-K (Pa. 
Envtl. Hear’g Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
 82. See, e.g., Commonwealth Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. City of Lebanon, 393 A.2d 381, 384 (Pa. 
1978) (“The [Department of Environmental Resources] . . . produced evidence that fluoride 
treatment has been successfully practiced in this country for decades . . . without producing any ill 
effects.”); see also Oley Twp. v. PaDEP, 710 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (findings of 
fact must be supported by substantial evidence). 
 83. Concerned Residents of the Yough, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 639 A.2d 1265, 1269 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1994) (holding that when an objector to DEP action produces credible evidence, the 
burden of proof shifts to DEP to justify its action); Marcon, Inc. v. PaDEP, 462 A.2d 969, 971 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1983). 
 84. See Ainjar Trust v. PaDEP, 806 A.2d 482, 488 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). 
 85. Marcon, Inc., 462 A.2d at 971.  The burden of proof is comprised of the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion.  Riedel v. County of Allegheny, 633 A.2d 1325, 1329 n.11 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).  The burden of persuasion never shifts, but the burden of production of 
evidence to support a particular proposition might.  Id.; see also In re Loudenslager’s Estate, 240 
A.2d 477, 482 (Pa. 1968) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that the burdens of persuasion and 
production may be allocated to different parties). 
 86. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in 
Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (2008) (providing an overview of contemporary debates 
and leading cases concerning the standard of review in administrative law).  Likewise, we do not 
address in this Article the ethical duties of attorneys with respect to idealized scientific arguments.  
See generally David S. Caudill, Legal Ethics and Scientific Testimony: In Defense of Manufacturing 
Uncertainty, Deconstructing Expertise, and Other Trial Strategies, 52 VILL. L. REV. 953 (2007) 
(arguing that because the ethical standard only prohibits presentation of testimony known to be false, 
there is no ethical prohibition against presenting questionable scientific expertise). 
 87. U.S. EPA, PUBL’N. NO. 841-B-02-002, available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl 
/20needsreport_8-02.pdf. 
 88. See id. at 7–31. 
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analysis and recommendations concerning scientific issues,”89 it 
constitutes a smorgasbord of scientific shortcomings that would invite 
any TMDL stakeholder to challenge ongoing TMDL issuances.  Given 
National Research Council backing for such recommendations,90 it 
would not seem unreasonable to criticize TMDL science.  On the other 
hand, the TMDL program continues to develop in the face of Clean 
Water Act mandates, so it is easy to see why TMDLs are created despite 
such potential challenges.  In this study, we encountered TMDLs that 
reflect the shortcomings of the current program, with all of its 
uncertainties and limitations in terms of resources and data.  We decided 
not to speculate on whether the TMDLs could withstand judicial scrutiny 
as based on substantial evidence, but rather to identify arguments that 
seem unreasonable early in the comment phase, given the current 
uncertainties and existing limitations upon data and resources.  For 
example, when we identify as unreasonable the criticism of a ten percent 
margin of safety (or lack of site-specific data) because the critic fails to 
suggest an alternative analysis, we are not suggesting that the burden of 
proof on a party challenging the TMDL requires submitting an 
alternative analysis; rather, we are suggesting that such criticism is 
neither helpful nor constructive.  When such criticisms are raised and the 
response of the EPA or PaDEP is simply to confirm that the margin of 
safety (or the amount of existing data) is scientifically adequate, the 
subtext of the response seems to be, “Of course, it would be better to 
conduct a formal uncertainty analysis (or to collect more data), but we 
cannot interminably delay the TMDL program.”  Further examples will 
be offered in this Article, but we should clarify that we are not 
addressing the status of an argument identified as idealized in the context 
of judicial review of EPA or PaDEP actions.  Nevertheless, an idealized 
argument may well be viewed by an agency as insignificant or irrelevant, 
or by a court as unpersuasive in deciding whether agency action is 
supported by substantial evidence, precisely because of the compulsory 
nature of TMDLs (i.e., regardless of the science in hand, TMDLs must be 
created, which counsels against a stringent scientific standard and in 
favor of adaptive implementation). 
For example, in the litigation that followed the EPA’s approval of 
the Anacostia TMDL, the federal district court’s memorandum opinion 
                                                          
 89. Id. at v, 1. 
 90. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the National 
Research Council has recommended changes in the TMDL process “with an understanding that 
without such changes, the TMDL program will be unable to incorporate and improve upon the best 
available scientific information”). 
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referred to the argument by Friends of the Earth that the EPA’s margin of 
safety did not take “into account any lack of knowledge concerning 
relationship between effluent limitations and water quality.”91  The court 
explained that the “plaintiff misconstrues the threshold for satisfying a 
margin of safety requirement”92—the EPA need only take into account 
all the relevant evidence because determining a margin of safety is a 
“matter of administrative policy and scientific uncertainty.”93  In other 
words, the mere presence of uncertainty is not a flaw, and the plaintiff 
was setting an idealized standard for managing uncertainty.  
Significantly, this argument highlights the use of uncertainty claims by 
environmentalist groups—idealization is a strategy available to everyone, 
not only to those stakeholders subject to environmental regulation.  
Another example of an environmentalist challenge to a TMDL is found 
in Muszynski.94  In that case, the court seemed to view the challenge as 
idealistic—the ten percent margin of safety was supported by substantial 
evidence and the use of aesthetic water quality standards to regulate 
phosphorus in water supply waterbodies was not arbitrary or 
capricious.95  While such cases strongly suggest that idealized arguments 
will not work in challenges to agency action, this study does not address 
that phenomenon (except to note that the effect of idealized arguments is 
quite visible when discussed in published opinions).  In the initial 
stakeholder responses to a TMDL, our limited goal was to identify 
arguments that seemed to make unreasonable or unrealistic demands on 
the EPA and/or PaDEP, and to consider their capacity for causing delay 
or withdrawal of the TMDL. 
 
                                                          
 91. Friends of the Earth v. U.S. EPA, 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 198–99 (D.D.C. 2004) (granting 
defendant EPA’s motion for summary judgment), rev’d, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  The margin 
of safety must take “into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between 
effluent limitations and water quality.”  Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 
130.2(i) (1989)). 
 92. Id. at 199. 
 93. Id. (emphasis added).  That is, the Clean Water Act mandate to include a margin of safety, 
indicating Congress expected states and the EPA to proceed in the face of uncertainty, factors into 
the agency’s burden of proof. 
 94. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 95. See id. at 101, 103.  Note that most environmentalist challenges to TMDLs focus on 
margins of safety and try to make the TMDL more stringent, while industry stakeholders focus more 
on the relationship between the TMDL and environmental processes in an effort to make the TMDL 
less stringent. 
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C. Summary of Findings 
We did not find any significant examples of obvious or explicit 
idealizations of science, such as the arguments that (1) the TMDL is 
inappropriate because some level of uncertainty rendered it imperfect, or 
(2) an opponent’s scientific arguments are invalid due to bias and 
affiliation with a party.  Everyone realizes there are uncertainties in the 
TMDL process96 and that almost every scientific report is commissioned 
by an entity or individual with some interest in the outcome of the 
controversy.  In some challenges to TMDLs, however, we did identify 
idealizations that might be called subtle or implicit: 
(1)  Arguments that there is “too much uncertainty” in the 
development of the TMDL, or that the “margin of safety is too 
conservative.”  Such arguments imply there is some threshold of science 
left unsatisfied, but no such threshold is offered.  By failing to specify 
how much uncertainty is tolerable, or what an appropriate margin of 
safety might be, the argument devolves into a demand for an imaginary 
or unknown standard.97 
(2)  Arguments that fail to consider the effect of an alleged error or 
the magnitude of the effect.  As there are no explicit claims that the 
science behind a TMDL decision must be perfect, the general argument 
that there is too great an error appears to be a reasonable objection.  
However, when a party argues a model is “inappropriate” (e.g., an algae 
level analysis based on lakes is applied to streams), there is sometimes 
no explanation as to why the model is inappropriate (e.g., does the lake 
model over-predict or under-predict algae growth?), or what the effect of 
a different model would be on the water management decision, including 
the magnitude of the effect (e.g., the effect may be minimal).  If effect 
and magnitude are not considered by the challenger, then the challenge 
implies that any imperfection renders the governing model inappropriate.  
                                                          
 96. See SHABMAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 13–23.  The authors detail the uncertainty that 
exists at several stages of the TMDL process.  At the stage of listing impaired waters, “there will 
always be analytical uncertainty [as a result of data limitations] in establishing whether water quality 
criteria are being met and in assessing the effectiveness of implementation in securing” water quality 
standards.  Id. at 14.  At the TMDL stage, “the level of uncertainty in TMDL evaluations is rarely 
well defined and often large,” and predictions from simple models (not reflecting the “full 
complexity of a situation”), as well as from complex models with limited data, may be uncertain.  Id. 
at 17.  At the implementation stage, one problem is the “large uncertainty in quantifying the 
contributions of and effectiveness of controls on nonpoint sources.”  Id. at 19.  At later stages where 
there is attainability uncertainty, “the uses and criteria appropriate and attainable for a particular 
water body may be uncertain.”  Id. at 20. 
 97. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between margins of 
safety and formal uncertainty analyses). 
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We identified this as a form of idealization because any error provides a 
basis for opposing a TMDL.98 
Of course, this form of argument may not signal an idealization or 
necessarily indicate an invalid argument.  It is likely a stakeholder 
complaining about a model may not have the opportunity to run a new 
model, and therefore cannot test the effect and magnitude of an 
alternative analysis.  Nevertheless, we found examples of some basic 
objections associated with calibration, analytic parameters, sample value 
averaging, and the use of non-local data that neither addressed nor 
speculated upon the effect or magnitude of the alleged error. 
(3)  Arguments that fail to consider whether the science supporting a 
TMDL is the best alternative despite its error or uncertainty.  For 
example, numerous technical reports commissioned by stakeholders 
questioned procedures in the TMDL analysis without indicating a 
preferred process.  Again, due to practical constraints on the part of 
regulators and stakeholders, the form of this argument in some cases 
simply reflects time and resource limitations rather than idealization.  
Nevertheless, by failing to suggest better alternative analyses, some 
arguments end up impliedly demanding perfection and therefore idealize 
the capacity of science to produce certainty. 
TMDL controversies can be conceived as a process in which 
justifiable (or reasonable) scientific arguments and idealized (or 
unrealistic) scientific arguments alternatively appear.  For example, when 
an error or uncertainty is identified in a TMDL document, the argument 
that such a fundamental flaw renders the TMDL scientifically unsound 
may or may not be an idealization—if the demand is that TMDLs must 
be free from minor errors or moderate uncertainty, the capacity of 
science is idealized.  But if the argument is that the error or uncertainty is 
too great, then we believe three questions should follow: 
(1)  Is there another procedure or method that would produce less 
error or uncertainty?  If so, the flaw is the failure to use that procedure 
or method.  If not, then the objection to error or uncertainty is impliedly 
an idealization of science as error free and certain. 
                                                          
 98. See Elizabeth Mishalanie & Charles Ramsey, Obtaining Trustworthy Environmental Data: 
Sampling and Analysis Issues, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 522 (1999).  Although the authors 
focus on the frequent need for property owners or buyers to know the level of chemical 
contamination in soil, their discussion of the inevitability of error in measurement is applicable to the 
TMDL program.  Because all “measurements are actually estimates” that include potential bias 
(over- or under-estimation) and variability (scatter or imprecision) errors, “the true accuracy of any 
measurement is something that can never be known.”  Id. at 522.  Moreover, even when sampling 
errors are negligible, samples of the same material sent to multiple independent laboratories will 
result in varying determinations of the average concentration of a chemical.  See id. at 525–26. 
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(2)  Does the flaw adversely affect the challenger, i.e., what is the 
effect on the water management decision?  If the identifiable effect of the 
flaw is to set unjustifiable restrictions on the regulated party, then the 
demand for (or production of) more data and corrected measurements is 
reasonable.  If, on the other hand, a party demands more data without 
knowing (or at least speculating upon) the effect more data would have 
on the TMDL, the argument is reduced to a claim that the flaw is the 
presence of error or uncertainty, which idealistically assumes only error-
free science is adequate. 
(3)  What is the magnitude of the effect of the flaw?  That is, what is 
the practical effect on the water management decision?  For example, if a 
model for algae growth omits a variable for shade from sunlight, then a 
challenge based on the significance of this omission for the TMDL 
would be reasonable.  If, however, the omission is highlighted as a per se 
indicator of a flawed analysis, without showing (or speculating upon 
whether) the effect is significant,99 then science has been idealized as an 
enterprise that considers every variable. 
By far, most of the scientific arguments that appeared in the subject 
TMDL controversies were reasonable and justifiable.  For example, 
claims of zero correlation between a nutrient and algae production do not 
inherently idealize science—an alternative is offered (e.g., no 
regulation), along with a detrimental effect (e.g., unnecessary load 
reduction) and a consideration of magnitude (e.g., the waterway is 
completely insensitive to changes in nutrient loading).  Therefore, claims 
of unachievable outcomes are inherently reasonable (e.g., no amount of 
reduction of a nutrient will produce a specified water quality outcome).  
However, we identified numerous examples of claims that did not 
consider or answer the foregoing questions concerning better 
alternatives, the effects of alleged errors, and magnitude of the effects.  
While it is not unreasonable to identify, define, examine, and criticize 
flaws in the TMDL process, the mere presence of a flaw does not in itself 
render the TMDL scientifically unsound.  To argue it does is impliedly 
premised on the idealized notion that science is never erroneous or 
uncertain. 
Using the foregoing template, we surveyed the technical and 
scientific objections to the five TMDLs in our study and constructed a  
 
                                                          
 99. We refer here to practical significance, as when a small error may have no practical effect 
(all models have errors but are nevertheless potentially useful) and should therefore not serve as 
grounds for opposition.  We recognize that “significance” is a term of art, and we are not referring, 
for example, to statistical, economic, or ecological significance. 
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database and set of categories for coding the arguments we considered 
idealized. 
III. CATEGORIZING THE DATA 
[Alexander Von] Humboldt tilted his head back. . . .  The 
understanding of the cosmos had made great strides . . . .  The end of 
the road was in sight, the measuring of the world almost complete. . . .  
Science would bring about an era of the general good, and who could 
know if one day it might even solve the problem of death.100 
A. Five TMDL Controversies 
We began this study by focusing on the TMDL for the Skippack 
Creek Watershed in Montgomery County in southeastern Pennsylvania, 
which was issued by the EPA.  The efforts to address excessive algae in 
Skippack Creek (listed as impaired in 1996, 1998, 2002, and 2004) 
resulted in a brief scientific controversy beginning in 2004 with a report 
to PaDEP,101 followed by an informational meeting, a pre-public meeting 
of the stakeholders, a draft TMDL for public comment, the final TMDL, 
an appeal to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, and a 
withdrawal of the TMDL in 2007 (to be re-issued in the near future).102  
                                                          
 100. DANIEL KEHLMANN, MEASURING THE WORLD 204 (Carol Brown Janeway trans., 2006). 
 101. On December 11, 2004, Dr. Hunter Carrick from Penn State University (under contract 
with PaDEP) submitted a report summarizing his algae sampling and concluded that the Skippack 
Creek was saturated with nutrients and environmentally degraded.  Hunter J. Carrick, Using 
Periphyton to Estimate TMDL Endpoints and Assess Impairment in an Urban-Suburban Stream 
(Skippack Creek, Pennsylvania), in EPA Region III, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR SKIPPACK 
CREEK, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA app. D. (2005) [hereinafter Carrick’s Report]. 
 102. A public meeting was held December 15, 2004, to review the technical data with the 
stakeholders.  Notice of Appeal, Lower Salford Twp. Auth. v. PaDEP, No. 2005-100-K (Pa. Envtl. 
Hearing Bd. May 16, 2005).  On January 20, 2005, the draft TMDL was sent out for public 
comment, and a public meeting was held on February 16, 2005.  EPA Region III, TOTAL MAXIMUM 
DAILY LOAD FOR SKIPPACK CREEK, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 68 (2005) [hereinafter 
SKIPPACK CREEK TMDL].  The comments and EPA responses were published on April 15, 2005.  
The final TMDL, issued on April 9, 2005, is seventy-one pages long (with twenty-two pages of 
appendices), and is supported by an eighty-three-page modeling report (with nineteen pages of 
appendices).  See SKIPPACK CREEK TMDL, supra.  Eleven point source dischargers were affected, 
seven of which are municipal sewage dischargers.  As an example, the Borough of Souderton had an 
NPDES permit for 2 mg/liter of total phosphorus, and the TMDL reduced its allowable total 
phosphorous effluent limit to .24 mg/liter and its allocated load to 1463 lbs/yr.  See id. at 63.  The 
Borough filed its appeal on October 31, 2006.  Notice of Appeal, Borough of Souderton v. PaDEP, 
No. 2006-240-K (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Oct. 31, 2006).  This followed an appeal by two other 
municipal authorities on May 16, 2005.  Notice of Appeal, Lower Salford Twp. Auth., supra.  On 
January 8, 2007, the EPA announced its intention to withdraw the TMDL due to an error in one of 
the scientific papers on which Dr. Carrick had relied.  See Carrick’s Report, supra note 101; Status 
Report at 1–2, Lower Salford Twp. Auth. v. PaDEP, No. 2005-100-MG (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 
6, 2007). 
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Scientific arguments appear not only in the comments and appeal 
documents, but in four technical reports commissioned by stakeholders 
and submitted to PaDEP on November 15, 2006.103 
The second controversy in our study followed the issuance of the 
Conestoga Headwater TMDL, which PaDEP prepared in August 2004 
for submission to the EPA.104  Four point source dischargers were 
identified, and a nineteen percent reduction in phosphorus loading was 
required to meet water quality standards.105  Appeals were filed, 
consolidated in June 2005, and withdrawn in November 2006.106  The 
third controversy followed the EPA approval of PaDEP’s TMDL for 
portions of Neshaminy Creek on December 9, 2003; seven point source 
dischargers filed appeals, and the TMDL was withdrawn in 2007 for the 
same reason the Skippack Creek TMDL was withdrawn.107  The fourth 
controversy followed the EPA’s issuance of the December 15, 2003 
TMDL for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in zones 2–5 of the Tidal 
Delaware River; the health concern was the potential carcinogenic 
effects of eating contaminated fish found in the Delaware Estuary.108  An 
appeal was filed with the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board by 
                                                          
 103. See FRANK X. BROWNE, F.X. BROWNE, INC., REVIEW AND COMMENT ON THE [SKIPPACK 
CREEK TMDL & CARRICK’S REPORT], 2–20 (2006); THOMAS W. GALLAGHER, HYDROQUAL, INC., 
A REVIEW OF [CARRICK’S REPORT] 2–7 (2006); X. SEAN ZHANG, CARROLL ENG’G CORP., A 
REVIEW AND OPINION ON DATA ANALYSIS AND THE SELECTION OF LITERATURE REGRESSION 
MODELS IN [THE SKIPPACK CREEK TMDL] 5–11 (2006).  A fourth report was filed by James S. 
Cosgrove, but was not considered in this Article. 
 104. The Conestoga River headwater is the most upstream 1.2 miles of the river in Berks 
County, Pennsylvania, identified in Pennsylvania’s 1996 § 303(d) list as impaired by nutrients, 
organic enrichment, and low dissolved oxygen.  See PADEP CENTRAL OFFICE, TOTAL MAXIMUM 
DAILY LOAD (TMDL): CONESTOGA HEADWATERS LANCASTER/BERKS COUNTY, OFFICE OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT, 1 (2004) [hereinafter CONESTOGA HEADWATERS TMDL].  The TMDL was 
developed using Black Creek in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania as a reference watershed.  Id. at 9. 
 105. Id. at 1. 
 106. See infra notes 148–49. 
 107. See 37 PA. BULL. 33, (Aug. 18, 2007); PaDEP, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE NESHAMINY CREEK WATERSHED IN SOUTHEAST PENNSYLVANIA (2003) 
[hereinafter NESHAMINY CREEK TMDL].  The TMDL will likely be re-issued, like the Skippack 
Creek TMDL, in the near future; Dr. Carrick had also done the endpoint estimates final report 
leading up to the Neshaminy Creek TMDL, and the same erroneous article had been relied upon.  
See Carrick’s Report, supra note 101, HUNTER J. CARRICK, TMDL ENDPOINT ESTIMATES FOR [AN] 
URBAN-SUBURBAN STREAM BASED UPON IN-STREAM PERIPHYTON ASSEMBLAGES (NESHAMINY 
CREEK, PENNSYLVANIA) (2005). 
 108. The estuary is that section of the Delaware River (and tidal portions of its tributaries) 
between the head of Delaware Bay and the head of the tide in Trenton, New Jersey—about eighty-
five miles.  DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, U.S. EPA, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS FOR 
POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (PCBS) FOR ZONES 2–5 OF THE TIDAL DELAWARE RIVER i–ii (2003) 
[hereinafter DELAWARE RIVER TMDL].  It is designated as fishable waters and listed as impaired on 
the § 303(d) lists of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, based on elevated levels of PCBs in 
fish tissue.  Id. at ii. 
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multiple parties on May 31, 2005, and withdrawn in October 2005.109  
The fifth and final controversy followed the EPA’s issuance of a 
complex TMDL in October 2003, for segments of the Wissahickon 
Creek impacted by nutrients and silt in lower Montgomery County and 
the highly urbanized northwestern Philadelphia County.110  The City of 
Philadelphia appealed the TMDL in October 2005, but withdrew its 
appeal in May 2006.111  For purposes of comparison, we also looked at 
the District of Columbia litigation between the EPA and Friends of the 
Earth over the validity of the Anacostia River TMDL for nutrients and 
silt in various regions, including Montgomery County, Maryland.112  We 
focused on the documents in the federal lawsuit, a much more formal 
setting for technical and scientific arguments, to see whether idealized 
arguments played a role.113 
B. Categories of Arguments 
Our first category of arguments claiming too much uncertainty, or 
too conservative a margin of safety, expanded to include idealized 
arguments claiming there was not enough data, too many assumptions, 
too little reliability, and other shortcomings identified as flaws without 
indicating what the threshold might be for overcoming the flaw.  That is, 
as there will always be uncertainties, incomplete data, assumptions, and 
some conservatism regarding margins of safety, we categorized as 
idealized those arguments implying that any shortcomings rendered the 
TMDL unscientific.  The second category was less complex and 
distinguished the idealized arguments that did not consider the effect of 
the claimed flaw from those that considered the effect but did not 
consider the magnitude of the effect.  The third category included 
arguments that were idealized because no alternative method or better 
                                                          
 109. Docket, Delaware County Reg’l Water Quality Control Auth. v. PaDEP, No. 2005-115-K, 
http://ehb.courtapps.com/public/document_shower_pub.php?docket_no=2005115 (last visited Sept. 
27, 2008). 
 110. The PaDEP listed Wissahickon Creek as designated for trout stocking and impaired due to 
nutrients, silt, low dissolved oxygen, chlorine, flow variability, oil, grease, and pathogens.  See U.S. 
EPA, NUTRIENT AND SILTATION TMDL DEVELOPMENT FOR WISSAHICKON CREEK, PENNSYLVANIA 
(2003) [hereinafter WISSAHICKON CREEK TMDL]. 
 111. See Notice of Appeal, City of Philadelphia v. PaDEP, No. 2005-308-M6 (Pa. Envtl. 
Hearing Bd. Oct. 25, 2005).  When the City of Philadelphia received a new NPDES permit in 
September 2005, it appealed the permit to the Board, but withdrew its appeal on May 15, 2006.  See 
id.  The City, it appears, was essentially challenging its NPDES permit, and its challenge to the 
TMDL (established by the EPA) was primarily to preserve arguments for a federal court appeal if 
deemed necessary. 
 112. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 142–43 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 113. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
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process was offered.  These three categories are reflected in Table 1,114 
which summarizes the arguments discussed in more detail in the 
following narrative. 
1. Claims of Threshold Failures Lacking Thresholds 
a. Initial Examples 
Four of the municipal dischargers affected by the Skippack Creek 
TMDL (an effort to reduce excessive algae by reductions of nutrients) 
submitted comments on the draft TMDL, several of which illustrate, 
respectively, an aspect of the first form of idealized argument.  The 
Upper Gwynedd-Towamencin Municipal Authority argued that the 
model calibrations were poor and “of considerable concern, because it 
suggests that predictions with the model have such a high level of 
uncertainty that they cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that the 
TMDL objectives will be achieved.”115  In response to such 
ambiguities—a “high level of uncertainty,” unreliable predictions, poor 
calibrations—the EPA simply stated that “the calibration and validation 
are good.  There was a margin of safety used to account for 
uncertainty.”116  Although the EPA has been criticized for arbitrary 
selection of margins of safety without thoroughly analyzing the 
uncertainty of its models (which could minimize forecast error),117 such 
that objections to TMDL uncertainty can be justified, the above comment 
suggests no standard. 
Similarly, criticism that the supporting data are insufficient, without 
indicating a level of sufficiency, was categorized as an implicit 
idealization.  For example, the Borough of Lansdale commented that the 
original § 303(d) listings “were based on inadequate information . . . and 
that the data should be enhanced with a more rigorous scientific 
analysis . . . .”118  On this point, which raises doubts about whether 
Skippack Creek is impaired by algae, the EPA curtly responded that not 
only does the data confirm pollutant sources, but that visual inspection 
reveals the presence of excessive algae in the waters—“thick green 
                                                          
 114. See infra Table 1. 
 115. SKIPPACK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 57, at 6, cmt. 02-01. 
 116. Id. at 3, cmt. 01-05, response 01-05. 
 117. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 10 (stating the “EPA should end the 
practice of arbitrary selection of the margin of safety and instead require uncertainty analysis as the 
basis for margin of safety determination”). 
 118. SKIPPACK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 57, at 33, cmt. 07-02. 
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floating mats” of it.119  Another criticism, by the Lower Salford 
Township, questioned whether conducting limited in-stream water 
sampling and algal growth assessment at a dozen sites “on only two days 
within a thirty day time period” was sufficient.120  As no higher standard 
was proposed, the EPA simply responded that this “data collection 
program was carefully designed,” and the “data [were] used to calibrate 
and validate a water quality model . . . [that was] used to simulate the 
conditions in the stream under critical conditions.”121 
Finally, the Borough of Souderton demanded the EPA conclusively 
show “that water quality standards will be attained,”122 which we 
classified as an idealized demand for certainty.  The EPA, however, did 
not view the comment as an unreasonable uncertainty claim, but rather 
responded that its “analysis does indeed show that the goal will be 
met.”123  This may signal a different standard for “conclusively showing” 
something, but in any event indicates that the EPA viewed the comment 
as a reasonable argument.  By contrast, in response to a comment by the 
Borough of Lansdale that the “TMDL does not show that the water 
quality standards will be attained by its implementation,”124 the EPA 
stated that the TMDL “was based in sound science and existing . . . site-
specific data and information.”125  This response seems to recognize an 
unreasonable demand for certainty and proof, which accords with our 
assessment that the challenge was idealized.  Significantly, the issue in 
both of these claims for more certainty (regarding the effectiveness of the 
TMDL) is whether nonpoint sources are the major cause of algae growth, 
which is a justifiable concern.  Therefore, the argument by the Borough 
of Souderton, in another comment, that its interpretation of the data 
indicates that point source controls will not correct the algae problem,126 
is a reasonable scientific argument—it can be framed as a controversy  
 
 
                                                          
 119. Id., response 07-02. 
 120. Id. at 28, cmt. 06-08. 
 121. Id., response 06-08. 
 122. Id. at 24, cmt. 05-15.  The comment identifies segments of Skippack Creek that exceed the 
algae level even though there is no point source in those segments, states that the impact of nonpoint 
sources has been ignored, and paraphrases a PaDEP representative who acknowledged the uncertain 
benefits of reducing phosphorus levels.  Id. 
 123. Id., response 05-15. 
 124. Id. at 39, cmt. 07-14.  The comment suggested the algae problem may lie with nonpoint 
sources, and that the EPA “has not demonstrated that reductions in phosphorus discharges from 
point sources . . . will attain the goal.”  Id. 
 125. Id., response 07-14. 
 126. Id. at 16, cmt. 05-03. 
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over interpretation of the data rather than an idealized demand for 
certainty.  In its response, the EPA confirmed its own interpretation: 
[T]he main cause of the high levels of algal growth is caused by the 
large amounts of nutrients, particularly phosphorus, that is being 
discharged by the wastewater treatment facilities. . . .  [C]ontribution of 
phosphorus from nonpoint sources is insignificant as compared to the 
point sources at low flow conditions.127 
The EPA took the comment as a serious scientific challenge and then 
declared it to be wrong. 
Because of our interest in identifying the form or structure of 
idealized arguments, we neither considered idealized arguments to be 
“wrong” nor even attempted to judge the scientific correctness or validity 
of arguments in our study.  For example, the Borough of Souderton saw 
no documented “correlation between in-stream phosphorus concentration 
and algae growth,” and pointed out that the EPA report conceded the 
data does “not appear to directly link specific water quality data . . . with 
the excessive algal growth observed.”128  In our framework, claims of no 
correlation are not idealized, but as the EPA explained in its response, 
numerous studies establish that link, and also demonstrate: 
[T]he nutrient-periphyton chlorophyll relationship reaches a plateau at 
high nutrient concentrations, because the periphyton becomes nutrient-
saturated.  [Skippack Creek] nutrient concentrations and periphyton 
chlorophyll levels are very high and correspond with this plateau. . . . 
[s]o that we would not expect to see a strong correlation between their 
biomass and water quality parameters.129 
That is, at the saturation point, any addition of nutrients will not cause 
more algae—the EPA rejects the stakeholder’s argument as misguided.  
Similarly, when the Borough of Souderton argued that its phosphorus 
discharges are well upstream of the substantial algae blooms, and 
therefore appear unrelated to the problem, the EPA explained that the 
impact of the Souderton wastewater facility can be far afield, “almost to 
the mouth of the Skippack even with all other point sources at zero.”130  
Moreover, “circumstances such as toxic metals in an effluent may 
                                                          
 127. Id., response 05-03. 
 128. Id. at 15, cmt. 05-02.  The Borough also argued that the apparent lack of correlation 
(between algal biomass and nutrient levels) was supported by eleven of forty-six papers reviewed, 
which is a significant variation, leading the Borough to conclude that the TMDL lacks a “sound 
basis.”  Id. 
 129. Id., response 05-02. 
 130. Id. at 17, response 05-04. 
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[inhibit] algal growth . . . near the discharge due to toxicity.”131  The 
Borough’s argument may be wrong, but it was a reasonable scientific 
question about the data and not an idealization.  Indeed, another 
argument by the Borough of Souderton appears to reflect a valid concern.  
When it questioned the EPA’s target criterion based on only one study 
and cited other studies with a higher target criterion, the EPA cited 
additional research for its position.132  But the argument engendered a 
genuine controversy.133  On the other hand, the Borough of Souderton’s 
general claim in its appeal that the TMDL “lacks a proper scientific 
basis,”134 without more, is an idealized argument because the threshold of 
propriety remains unspecified. 
The foregoing summation illustrates four different aspects of implied 
claims of uncertainty that correspond to four types or forms of 
arguments: (1) implied claims that there is too much uncertainty, (2) 
claims that the amount of data is inadequate and therefore the results are 
too uncertain, (3) claims that the attainability of the TMDL goals is not 
sufficiently demonstrated (i.e., too little confidence in the TMDL), and 
(4) general claims that the TMDL lacks a scientific basis.  Each type of 
argument is potentially reasonable and justifiable, but we categorized 
arguments that offered no threshold for (1) acceptable uncertainty, (2) 
adequate data, (3) confidence levels, or (4) scientific validity, as 
idealized. 
It should be mentioned that while this study was focused on the 
TMDL establishment stage, not the implementation stage, stakeholder 
comments often raised implementation concerns about whether the 
TMDL goals can be achieved, and sometimes conflated two different 
issues: (1) whether water quality standards will be met by the TMDL, 
regardless of source of pollution (i.e., the TMDL is inadequate); and (2) 
whether the TMDL can be achieved by adjusting a point source 
discharger’s permit (i.e., an adequate TMDL cannot be fully 
implemented because of nonpoint source problems).  While the former 
involves the sort of scientific arguments evaluated in this study, the latter 
is more an issue of regulatory policy and politics (e.g., is PaDEP actively 
regulating nonpoint sources?).  Challenges related to the latter are not 
                                                          
 131. Id. 
 132. See id. at 18, cmt. 05-06; response 05-06.  Specifically, the EPA’s target criterion (or 
“impairment trigger”) of 100 mg/m2 for the in-stream periphyton biomass (measured by chlorophyll 
a) value, was considered too low by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
(NJDEP).  The NJDEP drew on research indicating that this value could be as high as 200 mg/m2 
before any initial impacts are observed.  See id. 
 133. See supra note 132. 
 134. Notice of Appeal, Borough of Souderton, supra note 102, ¶ 20. 
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challenges to the scientific quality of the TMDL, but when the two are 
conflated, the result is not so much an idealization of science as a legal 
idealization.  Stakeholders may imply that implementation problems 
invalidate the TMDL, but questions about TMDL effectiveness in 
meeting water quality standards are independent from questions about 
how the TMDL program will be implemented. 
b. Additional Examples 
i. Too Much Uncertainty 
Most of the complete and sophisticated arguments in opposition to 
the Skippack Creek TMDL are found not in the brief comments on the 
draft TMDL, but in the four scientific reports commissioned by 
stakeholders and filed with PaDEP just after the Borough of Souderton 
appealed the TMDL to the Environmental Hearing Board.135  For 
example, one consulting firm argued in its report that because numerous 
factors affect stream periphyton biomass, including light, grazing, 
hydrology, and nutrients, the evaluation of nutrient concentrations should 
be site-specific—developing data from sites outside the region “is in-
adequate . . . in developing a target stream phosphorus concentration . . . 
because the uncertainty in the regression equation is too great and 
unacceptable.”136  The consultant’s demand for “good data” and an 
“experienced analyst [who] can provide . . . quantitative insight”137 
seems realistic, but is idealized insofar as we do not know how good the 
data must be, how experienced the analyst needs to be, what quantitative 
insight will be available, or how much uncertainty is acceptable.  That 
consultant also criticized the subjectivity of Dr. Carrick’s determination 
of nuisance level,138 suggesting a certain idealization of TMDL science 
as necessarily objective; a more realistic argument is the consultant’s 
claim that there is no scientific consensus (a subjective factor) 
concerning the nuisance level that Dr. Carrick found in the scientific 
literature, but even that criticism is idealized insofar as the report does 
not address the question of what consensus exists.139  This consultant’s 
report is particularly important for our study, because from one vantage it 
                                                          
 135. See supra note 103 (citing the four scientific reports, three of which were reviewed for this 
study). 
 136. HYDROQUAL, INC., supra note 103, at 5. 
 137. Id. at 6. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. at 2. 
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represents a carefully constructed attack on the flaws and shortcomings 
of Dr. Carrick’s report, and therefore appears to be a reasonable and 
justifiable argument in favor of sound data, scientific rigor, and 
consensus-building.140  On the other hand, because the arguments are 
almost wholly deconstructive—raising numerous objections without 
indicating what might be acceptable—the arguments imply that 
perfection is the goal.141  Indeed, the report also exemplifies the other 
three argument forms based on an uncertainty claim, namely the 
inadequacy of the data, the failure of the TMDL to achieve its goals, and 
the lack of a scientific basis.142  Moreover, the consultant’s report serves 
as an example of our other two categories of idealization, namely 
challenges that fail to consider the effect (or its magnitude) of identified 
flaws, and challenges that do not offer alternative procedures or 
methodologies.143  In this sense, the consultant’s arguments can be 
viewed as hyper-idealized, notwithstanding their foundation in valid 
scientific concerns. 
Finally, in the controversy surrounding the Neshaminy Creek 
TMDL, which was withdrawn for the same reason the Skippack Creek 
TMDL was withdrawn,144 the Borough of Lansdale based one of its 
objections to the draft TMDL on a statement in the draft that “it is very 
difficult to ascertain if nutrient loadings are in fact a problem in the 
Neshaminy Creek Watershed.”145  We classified this objection as 
idealized insofar as it implies that any uncertainty is enough to delay the 
TMDL.  Interestingly, that statement was removed from the final TMDL, 
which confirmed the PaDEP’s view that nutrients are indeed a problem 
in Neshaminy Creek. 
                                                          
 140. For example, HydroQual highlights the importance of seasonal changes for nutrient 
concentration analyses, as well as the need for spatial averaging (stream width) and averaging over a 
specified length of stream.  See id. at 3.  The report is also attentive to the problematic aspects of 
modeling where the “empirical components . . . weaken [a model’s] predictive power,” where there 
is little “testing against actual stream data,” and where calibration is not based on site-specific data.  
Id. at 6. 
 141. See id. at 6–7. 
 142. HydroQual ambiguously demands “good data,” suggests that background phosphorus and 
the failure to restore tree canopy will render the TMDL ineffective, and argues that Dr. Carrick’s 
target levels for chlorophyll a are “arbitrary,” “not based on scientific principles,” and lack 
“scientific rigor.”  Id. at 1–4, 6. 
 143. HydroQual’s concerns about seasonal changes, and the need for spatial and length-of-
stream averaging, for example, raise doubts without identifying the effects of alternative analyses, 
even if such “averaging” represents an alternative methodology.  See id. at 3. 
 144. See supra note 102 (detailing the relevant dates for the Skippack Creek TMDL and how Dr. 
Carrick’s error resulted in the Skippack Creek TMDL withdrawal). 
 145. See Letter from Jacob Ziegler, Director of Utilities, Borough of Lansdale, to PaDEP (Nov. 
14, 2003), at 8. 
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ii. Not Enough Data 
In the Wissahickon Creek TMDL controversy, one of the critical 
comments to the draft TMDL referred to the use of best management 
practices (BMPs)—the typical requirement imposed to address nonpoint 
source pollution—to achieve loading reduction goals: “[u]ntil enough 
scientifically valid data are generated to determine what needs to be 
done, the use of BMPs is a viable option that should be considered before 
imposing [an] unnecessary TMDL.”146  This argument is idealized 
because it offers no definition of “enough scientifically valid data,” and 
generally implies that the TMDL is insufficient, without offering a 
standard for sufficiency. 
Likewise, in the Conestoga Headwater TMDL controversy, the 
Borough of New Morgan (joined by four developers) filed a notice of 
appeal with the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board immediately 
after notice of the TMDL was published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin;147 
objections included PaDEP’s reliance on “old, inadequate data” to 
determine impairment, as well as “inadequate data” to develop the 
TMDL.148  Also, a developer that had joined the appeal, New Morgan 
Properties, amended its appeal a month later; its objections included the 
claim that PaDEP did not “provide an appropriate level of technical 
analysis supporting all TMDL elements,” and that the TMDL is not 
based on “adequate and appropriate data, modeling[,] and 
analysis . . . .”149  These arguments are idealized insofar as they do not 
suggest standards for adequate data or an appropriate level of analysis or 
modeling.  However, as these are claims in an appeal, one would not 
expect a complete scientific argument; if the appeals had reached a 
hearing (they were withdrawn in November 2006150), the parties would 
have presented evidence to support these claims.  By way of contrast, the 
                                                          
 146. EPA, WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, 16, cmt. 34-13 (2003).  The EPA 
responded that the TMDL, rather than being an alternative to BMPs, “can be used as a basis for 
determining the need for BMPs, determining the level of removal necessary from BMPs to meet 
water quality standards and the general location of where BMPs would be most effective.”  Id. at 16, 
response 34-13; 7, response 31-12. 
 147. 35 Pa. Bull. 13, 1936 (March 26, 2005).  The notice directed readers to the PaDEP website, 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/watermanagement_apps/TMDL/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2008), for access 
to the TMDL document. 
 148. Notice of Appeal, Borough of New Morgan v. PaDEP, No. 2005-078-K ¶ 22(a) (Pa. Envtl. 
Hearing Bd. Apr. 25, 2005). 
 149. Amended Notice of Appeal, New Morgan Props., L.P. v. PaDEP, No. 2005-079-K ¶ 34(a), 
(c) (May 13, 2005). 
 150. Docket, New Morgan Props., L.P. v. PaDEP, No. 2005-079-K, http://ehb.courtapps.com 
/public/document_shower_pub.php?docket_no=2005078 (last visited Sept. 26, 2008). 
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comments made to the EPA or PaDEP, and the technical reports 
consultants submitted on behalf of challengers when a draft TMDL has 
been published, are often relatively complete scientific arguments.  For 
example, regarding the technical reports, one consultant made a claim 
that the Skippack Creek TMDL is invalid because the EPA used an 
inappropriate, nonstandard method to measure algae that over-predicted 
algae in the order of two to sixty times a valid prediction.151  This claim 
is not idealized.  First, it does not simply state the uncertainty is too 
great, but rather implies that an accepted procedure, the standard method, 
establishes the standard for uncertainty.  Second, the claim does not state 
that any error is unacceptable, but rather that the method used by the 
EPA was more erroneous than the standard method.  Finally, the claim 
considers the effect of the error—overprediction—and specifies its 
significance. 
Another example, this time from the Neshaminy Creek TMDL 
controversy, is the Borough of Lansdale’s challenge, in comments to 
PaDEP, regarding the use of default or “textbook” data concerning 
stream conditions and characteristics in the computer model, and its 
suggested use of site-specific stream data; basing calibration of the 
model on data from only one water quality monitoring station is 
criticized, and obtaining data from each sub-basin is suggested.152  While 
these suggestions make the arguments stronger than an idealized 
argument, PaDEP viewed the argument as misguided, because its model 
did not use “default or textbook data,” but rather actual data as to land 
use, soils, topography, and climate “to drive the model.”153  Moreover, 
very few default values were employed and the techniques used to 
estimate various parameter values were based on well-established, 
standard approaches.154  PaDEP continued: “while there are more 
complex methodologies available and additional stream measurements 
[that] could have been made, we can conclude that the parameter values 
used in the modeling reflect the true condition based upon the accuracy 
of the simulated hydraulics and pollutant loads.”155  This response 
highlights the manner in which PaDEP considered the Borough’s 
                                                          
 151. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 152. COMMENTS AND RESPONSES (NEW) app. H, in NESHAMINY CREEK TMDL, supra note 107, 
at 7 (comment section) [hereinafter NESHAMINY CREEK COMMENTS/RESPONSES].  Because the 
argument concerning inadequate data offers some standards for review, it is not idealized.  However, 
we later classified this same argument as idealized because it does not specify the likely effect of 
better data on the TMDL.  See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 153. NESHAMINY CREEK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 152, at 7 (PaDEP response). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
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argument, even with its additional details, an idealized demand for more 
accurate data.  In short, any approach can be attacked for its assumptions, 
estimates, simulations, modeling, and therefore incomplete data, but 
those features do not in themselves render the TMDL unscientific. 
iii. TMDL Goals Will Not Be Achieved 
Another form of the idealized demand for certainty is the argument 
that the TMDL will not be effective.  For example, in the Skippack 
Creek TMDL controversy, the Borough of Lansdale stated that the 
“TMDL does not show water quality standards will be attained by its 
implementation” because the impairment problem may lie with nonpoint 
sources—the EPA “has not demonstrated that reductions in phosphorus 
discharges from point sources . . . will attain the goal.”156  The EPA, 
viewing that argument as demanding too much, responded that the 
TMDL “was based in sound science and existing state procedures, policy 
and site-specific data and information.”157  Notably, the same strategy 
was employed by an environmentalist law firm, the Mid-Atlantic 
Environmental Law Center, which questioned the EPA’s assumption that 
if “the ambient water quality target is met under critical conditions and 
the most stringent scenario,” then it should be met under all other 
conditions.158  The EPA viewed the demand to eliminate such 
assumptions as unreasonable or idealized because “it stands to reason” 
that a target met under critical conditions will be met in less critical 
conditions.159 
In the Conestoga Headwater TMDL controversy, numerous 
comments were submitted by a developer of “smart growth” towns, 
including the charge that PaDEP “has not provided reasonable 
assurances that the load reductions required by the TMDL can be 
achieved.”160   
                                                          
 156. SKIPPACK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 57, at 39, cmt. 07-14. 
 157. Id., response 07-14. 
 158. Id. at 12, cmt. 03-12.  The Center is a not-for-profit law firm serving public interest 
organizations.  See Mid-Atlantic Environmental Law Center, http://www.maelc.org (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2008). 
 159. Id. at 12, response 03-12.  “Critical condition” is a worst case scenario, which in this case is 
low flow because dilution is lowest and concentration is highest. 
 160. Comment & Response Document for the Conestoga Headwaters TMDL app. G, in 
CONESTOGA HEADWATERS TMDL, supra note 104, at 35, PaDEP response [hereinafter Conestoga 
Comments/Responses].  When the developer later filed an appeal to the Pennsylvania Environmental 
Hearing Board, it repeated the argument that the TMDL was deficient due to lack of “reasonable 
assurances that the nonpoint source load reductions . . . can be achieved.”  See Notice of Appeal, 
Borough of New Morgan, supra note 148, ¶ 22. 
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PaDEP’s response indicates that the agency views such an argument 
as excessive: 
The TMDL does not prescribe the exact BMPs [for non-point sources] 
or activities that need to be put in place that will result in meeting the 
allowable loading . . . determined in the analysis.  Subsequent 
remediation planning and implementation need to take place for the 
waterbody to recover, and subsequently additional biological 
monitoring will determine if the waterbody is attaining designated uses 
and can be removed from the list of impaired waters.161 
The subtext is clearly a frustrated acknowledgement of remediation 
uncertainty in the process, and efforts to eliminate uncertainty are viewed 
as idealizations.  Moreover, the issue of implementation, described in the 
above response, is different from the issue of whether the TMDL is 
scientifically sound. 
iv. Lack of a Scientific Basis 
The final form of arguments that imply uncertainty in the process is 
too great include general claims that the TMDL is not “scientifically 
defensible” (or does not reflect “current science”)162 or “is contrary to 
accepted engineering practice,”163 as well as more specific claims that, 
for example, the target levels for chlorophyll a were “arbitrary and not 
based on accepted scientific principles.”164  Such arguments appear 
idealized because they are based on an unspecified scientific standard.  
The EPA or PaDEP typically responded to this by claiming “[t]he TMDL 
is based on scientifically valid data and procedures”; therefore, “[t]he 
TMDL stands as is and will not be withdrawn or delayed.”165 
All three appeals in the Neshaminy Creek TMDL controversy 
claimed that PaDEP’s mathematical modeling results were inaccurate.166  
While one would not expect further argument in an appeal document, the 
claim does highlight the fact that some level of inaccuracy in modeling is 
                                                          
 161. Conestoga Comments/Responses, supra note 160, at 35, PaDEP response. 
 162. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 19, cmt. 35-01. 
 163. Id. at 26, cmt. 35-17. 
 164. HYDROQUAL, INC., supra note 103, at 1. 
 165. See WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 19, response 35-01. 
 166. See Notice of Appeal, Chalfont-New Britain Twp. Joint Sewage Auth., No. 2004-112-K, ¶ 
50(h) (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. May 12, 2004); Notice of Appeal, Borough of Lansdale v. PaDEP, No. 
2004-045-K, ¶ 33(m) (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 26, 2004); Notice of Appeal, Hatfield Twp. Mun. 
Auth. v. PaDEP, No. 2004-046-K, ¶ 53(h) (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 18, 2007).  These appeals 
were consolidated as Hatfield Twp. Mun. Auth. v. PaDEP, No. 2004-046-MG (Pa. Envtl. Hearing 
Bd.). 
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inevitable.  For example, in the Wissahickon Creek TMDL controversy, 
one commenter complained that “basing any TMDL on such limited data 
[e.g., a single sample measurement only ‘marginally below the minimum 
standard’] is scientifically unsound, unrealistic, and not reflective of real 
world conditions.”167  The EPA responded that the commenter perhaps 
misunderstood, and therefore idealized, water quality regulations: 
[T]he TMDL was based on, not specifically existing conditions, but on 
design conditions, which represent higher effluent flows and hence 
loadings of pollutants.  The existing stream concentrations may not 
represent those design conditions. . . .  [The] EPA believes that this 
TMDL is based on sound science, is realistic to design conditions[,] 
and reflects the actions and reactions within the Wissahickon Creek and 
its tributaries.168 
The inevitability of uncertainty—that is, when every existing stream 
concentration is not reflected in model-based regulation—does not signal 
a fundamental flaw in the TMDL.  Indeed, the frequent claim in 
commissioned scientific reports that nuisance levels for some chemicals 
are “arbitrary,”169 which reflects the legal standard for invalid 
administrative regulations, tends to eclipse the more minimal 
“arbitrariness” of round numbers such as “200 mg/m2” or the range of 
“100–150 mg/m2.”  Moreover, there is certainly a potential false 
perception of accuracy in setting “daily loads,” which appear to be 
precisely designated fractions of pounds but which are in fact not so 
neatly measurable.  Some level of inaccuracy and “arbitrariness” is 
therefore ubiquitous in the TMDL process and arguments based on the 
presence of uncertainty alone tend to demand perfection and thereby 
become idealized. 
2. Arguments That Do Not Consider the Effect of an Alleged Flaw or 
its Magnitude 
a. Effect 
We considered some of the scientific challenges in the TMDL 
process to be implicitly idealized because various shortcomings with 
respect to data or methodology were raised without considering, 
addressing, or speculating on the effect of those shortcomings on the 
                                                          
 167. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 15, cmt. 34-12. 
 168. See id. at 15, response 34-12. 
 169. See F.X. BROWNE, INC., supra note 103, at 16; HYDROQUAL, INC., supra note 103, at 2. 
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TMDL.  For example, in the notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Environmental Hearing Board, filed by two municipal authorities in the 
Skippack Creek TMDL controversy, the dischargers claimed the 
methodology used to develop the TMDL is fundamentally flawed—the 
data were unreliable: nonpoint source pollution, local conditions, and the 
effect of sunlight were not considered.170  However, there was no 
suggestion these deficiencies would change the TMDL or increase 
allowable loadings.  While one could argue an appeal document is not 
the place to discuss effects, even the expert hired by one of the municipal 
authorities did not address in his company’s report the effect that a 
demand for local, site-specific data might have on the TMDL.171  
Likewise, another expert commissioned to evaluate the science behind 
the Skippack Creek TMDL raised legitimate concerns about the effect of 
seasonal changes and the need for spatial averaging for stream analyses, 
but he did not in that criticism identify the effect (on the TMDL) if 
different data or methodologies were used.172  A third expert 
recommended further research because the report relied upon by the EPA 
was “not scientifically defensible,” but he did not address the effect of 
using more empirical literature on the TMDL.173 
In the Wissahickon TMDL controversy, one of the comments 
criticized the EPA for assuming “unrealistic flow scenarios” (the EPA 
model was based on low-flow conditions), but did not consider the effect 
of a more realistic model.174  The importance of considering the effect of 
more data or more realistic models is highlighted, quite dramatically, in 
the EPA’s response to the foregoing criticism—the EPA created an 
appendix representing a “more detailed analysis of the [available] 
seasonal data,” which “actually resulted in more stringent effluent 
limits.”175  Less dramatic, but also demonstrating the importance of 
considering the effect when a flaw is identified, is the EPA’s response to 
a very reasonable comment in the Wissahickon controversy criticizing 
the EPA’s assumption that the siltation load of a reference watershed 
represents the maximum allowable load above which the watershed 
                                                          
 170. See Notice of Appeal, Lower Salford Twp. Auth., supra note 102, ¶¶ 50–55. 
 171. F.X. BROWNE, INC., supra note 103, at 8.  The F.X. Brown report was commissioned by 
Borough of Souderton & Upper Gwynedd Twp.  Telephone Interview with Frank X. Browne, 
President, F.X. Browne, Inc. (Sept. 27, 2007). 
 172. HYDROQUAL, INC., supra note 103, at 3. 
 173. CARROLL ENG’G CORP., supra note 103, at 5–6 (criticizing Dr. Carrick, see supra note 101, 
for relying on empirical research focused on lakes, not streams). 
 174. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 9, cmt. 31-17. 
 175. Id. at 9, response 31-17 (referring to Appendix D, WISSAHICKON CREEK TMDL, supra note 
110, at D-11). 
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would be impaired, even though there is no evidence that additional 
loading would be unacceptable.176  For the EPA, the “reference 
watershed approach provides an estimate of the TMDL for the impaired 
watershed, but certainly is not assumed to be exact.  [The] reference 
watershed may understate [or overstate] the maximum load possible . . . .  
To provide additional assurance . . . an explicit margin of safety was also 
used.”177  In other words, the reference watershed approach (a commonly 
used and scientific method) is not based on proof that the reference 
stream is unimpaired.  So, it is clearly not the best evidence potentially 
available.  The TMDL process therefore exemplifies the limitations on 
data (and resources to generate data) prior to regulation, but the margin 
of safety is supposed to ensure that the TMDL effect of more accurate 
data would be minimal.  Thus, when a discharger pointed out that the 
Wissahickon TMDL did not account for tributaries such as Sandy Run—
such that “there is no way of evaluating whether the model reasonably 
predicts conditions in Sandy Run”178—the EPA responded that observed 
data on Sandy Run was consistent with simulated results, but “no 
mathematical model is developed to mimic all details of a real system 
(which is virtually impossible).  Considering all limitations of 
mathematical formulations, numerical solutions, and data sparseness 
against system complexity, a model can only be expected to represent the 
general behavior of the prototype system.”179  The EPA not only 
considered the argument to be an idealized demand for more data, but 
also suggested that the effect of any errors was minimal: “the model has 
been validated[,] . . . showed reasonable representation of the [dissolved 
oxygen] profile, . . . [and] was determined a sufficient representation . . . 
of the general magnitude” of relevant nutrients.180 
In the Conestoga Headwater TMDL controversy, a developer’s 
comments (1) that the data collection techniques (sampling locations and 
dates) were insufficient to determine current phosphorus loadings and 
needed reductions, and (2) that the reference watershed approach is 
“inadequate because of the myriad of differences between 
watersheds,”181 are idealized arguments insofar as there is no 
consideration of the effects of more data on the TMDL, or what level of 
                                                          
 176. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 21, cmt. 35-06. 
 177. Id., response 35-06. 
 178. Id. at 24, cmt. 35-12. 
 179. Id., response 35-12. 
 180. Id. at 25, response 35-13. 
 181. Conestoga Comments/Responses, supra note 160, at 32–35.  Notwithstanding our 
categorization of these arguments as idealized, the developer, on the basis of these arguments, 
received some favorable revisions to the TMDL. 
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differences would be appropriate.  Likewise, the Borough of New 
Morgan, in its appeal to the Conestoga Headwaters TMDL, objected to 
“reliance on old, inadequate data” to determine impairment, inadequate 
data to develop the TMDL, and lack of site-specific evaluations of 
phosphorus levels, all without considering the effect of new or more data 
on the TMDL.182 
In the Neshaminy Creek TMDL controversy, the Borough of 
Lansdale’s comments on the draft TMDL also included an argument that 
without site-specific stream data from each sub-basin, the TMDL is 
deficient, but there was no indication how the TMDL might change if 
additional data was used.183  Of course, the commenter might reply that 
such change is implied by the argument for more data.  Indeed, the 
Borough of Lansdale’s comment that PaDEP’s model should be based on 
algal growth, the alleged nuisance, rather than on phosphorus loading, 
suggests the effect on the TMDL would be substantial.184  PaDEP 
responded that nuisance algal growth is caused by excess phosphorus, 
and that in any event actual stream assessments revealed excessive algae; 
in short, by focusing on algal growth instead of phosphorus, the model 
would still be an approximation of actual conditions.185 
Finally, with respect to the Delaware PCB TMDL controversy, given 
that some level of error, uncertainty, and inaccuracy is inevitable in the 
TMDL process, the failure to discuss the effect of some of these flaws on 
the TMDL transforms otherwise reasonable concerns into an idealized 
demand for accuracy without regard to whether the result of EPA’s 
analysis would change.  For example, the comment by HydroQual that 
the Delaware PCB TMDL did not consider all sources of PCB 
contamination does not address how that error would affect the EPA’s 
load levels.186  Interestingly, however, HydroQual then accused the EPA 
of failing to discuss the “effect of [its own] error” when the EPA 
conceded that “the full inventory of Contaminated Site loadings from 
                                                          
 182. Notice of Appeal, Borough of New Morgan, supra note 148, ¶ 22.  In its amended appeal, 
the Borough of New Morgan also noted a failure “to consider spatial and temporal variations in 
loading capacity,” but did so without addressing how such considerations would affect the TMDL.  
Amended Notice of Appeal, Borough of New Morgan v. PaDEP, No. 2005-078-K, ¶ 29(k) (Pa. 
Envtl. Hearing Bd. May 13, 2005). 
 183. NESHAMINY CREEK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 152, at 7. 
 184. Id. at 9. 
 185. Id., PaDEP response.  “Even a model that attempts to compute algal cell growth can not 
answer the question of ‘how much is too much?’  That question can only be answered by actual 
stream assessments.”  Id. 
 186. HYDROQUAL, INC., COMMENTS ON THE DRBC PCB TMDL MODELS, in COMMENTS OF 
THE DELAWARE ESTUARY TMDL COALITION ON THE PCB TMDLS FOR THE DELAWARE ESTUARY 
app. C, at C-1 (2003) [hereinafter DELAWARE COMMENTS]. 
07-CAUDILL_FINAL 12/9/2008  10:05:26 AM 
2009] STRATEGIC IDEALIZATIONS OF SCIENCE 295 
New Jersey were not included due to time constraints.”187  Nevertheless, 
by identifying its own shortcuts and limitations, the EPA is not failing to 
consider the effect of those shortcomings, but rather concluding that, 
given a margin of safety, the effect of those shortcomings is minimal. 
b. Magnitude of the Effect 
Even when dischargers challenging a TMDL speculate as to the 
effect of an identified error, the magnitude of the effect is often not 
addressed.  For example, in the Neshaminy Creek TMDL controversy, 
five municipal wastewater authorities filed a notice of appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.  The appeal included an 
argument that while seven reservoirs discharge into Neshaminy Creek, 
the TMDL model only took four into account, which had the effect of 
over-estimating the amount of phosphorus coming from wastewater.188  
However, there is no mention of whether the effect would be significant.  
The Delaware PCB TMDL controversy included another example of this 
failure, found in a comment by HydroQual criticizing the EPA for 
assuming in its model that fish and water concentrations are at a constant 
ratio, rather than using a fish bioaccumulation model.  An effect of this 
shortcoming was identified—namely that fish tissue PCB concentrations 
may not decrease as predicted in the model189—but that over-prediction 
could be small or negligible.  The implicit idealization in such arguments 
is that the error becomes the focus of attention, as if any error invalidates 
the TMDL, rather than focusing on the result of the EPA model—the 
probabilistic accuracy and potential effectiveness of the prescribed load 
levels.  Without saying as much, the EPA considers such arguments to be 
idealized, as indicated by references in its responses to comments to 
margins of safety, the limitations of and lack of precision in 
mathematical models, and the inevitable uncertainty in its analyses. 
Arguments calling for more data, especially site-specific evaluations 
that take local factors (e.g., light, temperature, current substrate type, 
scouring effect of floods, or grazing)190 into account, appear reasonable.  
But, without addressing the effect of additional data and its magnitude, 
such arguments set idealized standards for regulating science.  Indeed, 
                                                          
 187. Id. at C-15. 
 188. Notice of Appeal, Hatfield Twp. Mun. Auth., supra note 166, ¶ 53. 
 189. DELAWARE COMMENTS, supra note 186, at C-12. 
 190. F.X. BROWNE, INC., supra note 103, at 2; see also Conestoga Comments/Responses, supra 
note 160, at 33 (“Extensive site-specific evaluations and analysis were required . . . .  No such 
analysis appears to have been done . . . .”). 
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when the Borough of Lansdale, in the Neshaminy Creek TMDL 
controversy, pointed out (without discussing effect or magnitude) the 
“significant omission” of data for dissolved oxygen ranges (which are 
important to determine phosphorus uptake by fixed aquatic life), PaDEP 
responded that such “lack of data does not indicate a lack of support for 
the TMDL,” which “was established to lower in-stream phosphorus 
concentrations and decrease attached algal growth.”191  If that goal is 
reached, then additional data on dissolved oxygen is not necessary except 
to serve an idealized conception of scientific certitude. 
3. Criticism Without Offering Alternatives 
Our last category of idealized arguments in the TMDL process 
captures those claims of analytical flaws that do not suggest an 
alternative analysis.  For example, in the Skippack Creek TMDL 
controversy, a comment by a municipal authority on the draft TMDL that 
simply challenges the calibration of the model for the nitrogen and 
phosphorus series as “poor” and reflecting “a high level of uncertainty,” 
without specifying improvements, leaves the EPA to respond, “[We] 
believe[] that the calibration and validation are good.”192  Perhaps one 
cannot expect dischargers to suggest alternative analyses in a brief 
comment, but in the scientific reports commissioned to challenge the 
Skippack Creek TMDL, we also found examples of dismissive 
statements, claiming that the report on which the EPA relied is 
“scientifically incorrect,”193 without offering an alternative. 
In the Wissahickon Creek TMDL controversy, one commenter 
simply stated that the TMDL “document is seriously flawed and should 
be withdrawn pending completion of a scientifically defensible TMDL 
and amendment of the water quality criteria to reflect current science and 
the actual time frames necessary to protect the existing and designated 
uses.”194  Without more, the EPA liturgically responded that “the TMDL 
is based on scientifically valid data and procedures,”195 as no alternative 
is suggested.  Finally, in the Conestoga Headwater TMDL controversy, a 
developer’s complaint that the sampling location and dates were 
insufficient, without more, leads to a PaDEP reply that the impairments 
                                                          
 191. NESHAMINY CREEK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 152, at 6. 
 192. SKIPPACK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 57, at 3, cmt. 01-05. 
 193. See F.X. BROWNE, INC., supra note 103, at 20. 
 194. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 19, cmt. 35-01. 
 195. Id. at 19, response 35-01. 
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addressed in the TMDL have been confirmed.196  If no better procedure 
or method is offered by dischargers challenging the TMDL, then their 
objections are reduced to an idealized claim that good science is based on 
comprehensive data collection. 
C. Summary of Arguments 
Table 1 provides a summary of the above narrative, and includes an 
abbreviated statement of each of the forty arguments identified above as 
idealized: 
Table 1: Typology of Idealized Arguments 
1. Arguments Involving Claims of Threshold Failure 
 
A. Too Much Uncertainty 
 
– Model calibrations poor, suggesting a high level of uncertainty197 
– Demand for “good data” from “experienced analyst” who can provide “quantitative 
insight”198 
– No scientific consensus on the nuisance level used in the TMDL199 
– Whether nutrient loadings are in fact a problem is difficult to ascertain200 
– Uncertainty in regression equation is too great because data from sites outside the 
region is inadequate201 
– Reference watershed is not representative of subject watershed202 
 
B. Not Enough Data 
 
– Original listing as impaired was based on inadequate information203 
– In-stream sampling at only a dozen sites on only two days is insufficient204 
                                                          
 196. Conestoga Comments/Responses, supra note 160, at 32. 
 197. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra note 137 and accompanying text\. 
 199. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
– Not enough “scientifically valid data” has been “generated”205 
– Reliance on old, inadequate data206 
– Inappropriate level of technical analysis207 
– Calibration based on only one water quality monitoring station208 
C. TMDL Goals May Not Be Achieved 
– EPA cannot conclusively show that water quality standards will be achieved209 
– TMDL does not show water quality standards will be achieved by implementation210 
– EPA does not show that water quality target will be met under all conditions211 
– PaDEP “has not provided reasonable assurances” that TMDL load restrictions can be 
achieved212 
D. Lack of a Scientific Basis  
– TMDL “lacks a proper scientific basis”213 
– TMDL is not “scientifically defensible” and does not reflect “current science”214 
– TMDL analysis “is contrary to accepted engineering practice”215 
– Target levels were “arbitrary and not based on accepted scientific principles”216 
– Mathematical modeling results are inaccurate217 
– Basing TMDL on limited data is scientifically unsound, unreliable, and unrealistic218 
 
                                                          
 205. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
2. Failure to Consider Effect or Magnitude 
A. Effect  
– Failure to consider nonpoint source pollution, local conditions, and effect of sunlight219 
– Failure to use spatial averaging for stream analysis, and failure to consider effect of 
seasonal change220 
– Further research needed (because of use of lake, not stream, data)221 
– Failure to use local, site-specific data222 
– Unrealistic flow scenarios were assumed223 
– Failure to account for tributaries to creek224 
– Insufficient data collection techniques and use of reference watershed inadequate225 
– Reliance on inadequate data to develop TMDL226 
– TMDL is deficient without site-specific stream data from each sub-basin227 
– Failure to consider all sources of PCB contamination228 
 
B. Magnitude  
– Only four of seven discharging reservoirs taken into account229 
– Rather than using fish bioaccumulation model, EPA assumed fish and water 
concentration are at constant ratio230 
– Failure to take local factors (e.g., light, temperature) into account231 
– Significant omission of data for dissolved oxygen ranges232 
 
                                                          
 219. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
3. Criticism Without Offering an Alternative 
– Calibration of the model is poor and causes high level of uncertainty233 
– Report on which EPA relied is “scientifically incorrect”234 
– TMDL document is seriously flawed and is not scientifically current or defensible235 
– Sampling locations and dates were insufficient236 
 
 
Table 2 is a re-classification of fourteen of the idealized arguments in 
Table 1 according to three typical areas of stakeholder concern, namely 
(1) calibration and shortage of data, (2) selection of flow rate, and (3) 
preference for site-specific data. 
1. Claims Involving Calibration and Shortage of Data 
Parties frequently claim that a model using only a few data points is 
invalid, and it is reasonable in most contexts to want more data and less 
uncertainty.  However, we have identified as idealized the claim that a 
TMDL is flawed solely on the basis that taking more samples will always 
be superior to taking fewer samples.  Even if the data is severely limited, 
the possibility exists that new data would not effect a reduction of the 
loading restriction.  And, even if additional data reduced the loading 
restriction, the effect might be minimal.  Therefore, we also identified 
challenges as idealized if stakeholders did not consider or speculate upon 
the effect of new data and its magnitude. 
2. Claims Involving an Agency’s Flow Rate Selection 
For low flow TMDLs, agencies identified critical low flow rates and 
permitted discharges, and modeled the systems using these values.  
Critics responded by asserting that observed flows should be used 
because they are more realistic.  We categorized these claims as idealized 
arguments based upon the premise that the effect or magnitude of the 
                                                          
 233. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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agency’s substitution of permitted flow for observed flow was not 
evaluated. 
3. Claims of Failure to Use Site-Specific Data 
Parties frequently claim that inaccuracy in regulation arise from the 
use of default or textbook parameter values for model input, or the use of 
regression equations based on regional or national data.  The use of 
reference watersheds, as well as data from lakes when regulating 
streams, are likewise targets of criticism.  While these concerns are valid, 
we categorized as idealized those arguments that seemed to demand 
comprehensive site-specific data, as well as those that did not consider or 
speculate upon the effect of site-specific data and its potential magnitude. 
 
 
Table 2: Classification of Idealized Arguments 
Claims Involving Calibration of Model and Shortage of Data 
Argument  
Type of Idealized 
Argument (from Table 1) 
– Model calibration poor, suggesting a high level of 
uncertainty237 
1.A., 3 
– Calibration based on only one water quality monitoring 
station238 
1.B. 
– Failure to account for tributaries to creek (“The 
calibration data are too sparse to make a valid 
calibration . . . .”)239 
2.A. 
– Failure to use local, site-specific data (one grab sample 
not adequate)240 
2.A. 
– Failure to consider nonpoint source pollution, local 
conditions, and effect of sunlight241 
2.A. 
– Failure to consider all sources of PCB contamination242 2.A. 
                                                          
 237. See supra notes 115, 192 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Claims Involving Agency’s Selection of Flow Rate 
Argument   
Type of Idealized 
Argument (from Table 1) 
– Only four of seven discharging reservoirs taken into 
account243 2.B. 
– Unrealistic flow scenarios were assumed (EPA model 
based on low-flow conditions)244 2.A. 
– EPA does not show water quality standards will be met 
under all conditions (and not simply critical low flow 
discharge)245 
1.C. 
Claims Involving Failure to Use Site-Specific Data 
 
Argument 
 
Type of Idealized 
Argument (from Table 1) 
– Failure to use local, site-specific data246 2.A. 
– Uncertainty in regression equation is too great because 
data from sites outside region is inadequate247 1.A. 
– Insufficient data collection techniques and use of 
reference watershed inadequate248 2.A. 
– TMDL is deficient without site-specific stream data 
from each sub-basin249 2.A. 
– Further research needed (because of use of lake, not 
stream, data)250 2.A. 
 
 
                                                          
 243. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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IV. RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
For regulatory science it has become a problem that there is no agreed 
upon end to research . . . . [S]cientific doubts become resources 
mobilized by different actors who have vested interest in public policy 
outcomes.  The raising of doubts becomes a tactic of postponement, 
leading to the decision to commission another study.251 
A. Initial Qualification Regarding the Database of Idealized Arguments 
The foregoing selection of idealized arguments is only intended to 
confirm the presence of such strategies in TMDL disputes, and should 
not suggest that the majority of the scientific and technical arguments we 
studied are idealized.  Depending on the number of dischargers affected 
by a TMDL, the number of scientific and technical challenges (and not 
legal, administrative, or other challenges252) found in comments to the 
draft TMDL, reports commissioned by dischargers, and notices of 
appeal, easily runs into the hundreds.  We would roughly estimate the 
number of idealized arguments as constituting only ten to fifteen percent 
of the total number of technical and scientific challenges in the materials 
reviewed, such that the vast majority of arguments are not idealized.253 
Examples of arguments we did not consider to be idealized include 
some challenges in the Skippack Creek TMDL controversy to Dr. 
Carrick’s report that the EPA relied upon.  In his commissioned response 
to Dr. Carrick, an expert noted that using chlorophyll a concentration as 
a surrogate for periphyton biomass (as did Carrick) is confounded by 
species-specific differences and environmental conditions such as 
temperature and light, rendering insufficient a single sampling event; an 
alternative standard analytic method (not used by Carrick) is then 
proposed—including measurement of “algal biomass by having the algae 
                                                          
 251. Margarita Alario & Michael Brün, Uncertainty and Controversy in the Science and Ethics 
of Environmental Policy Making, THEORY & SCI. (Vol. 2 2001), available at 
http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol002.001/02alariobrun.html (citing the findings in M. 
RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY (1986)). 
 252. Examples of such challenges would include procedural challenges (e.g., whether the TMDL 
is an “action” of PaDEP, or whether the parties had adequate time to respond to the TMDL); claims 
that the TMDL is arbitrary and capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence; claims that 
impairment listing decisions were improper; and complaints that compliance with the TMDL would 
be too expensive. 
 253. In the early phases of our study, we attempted to count the number of idealized arguments.  
About half of the scientific arguments seemed to contain at least one idealized “element” in our 
framework, with failure to identify effect and magnitude as dominant.  However, most of the 
comments submitted did not fit into our framework because they were administrative, legal, or 
procedural; were requests for more data or clarification; or were simply too vague for analysis. 
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enumerated and . . . calculating the number and volume of algae”—and 
previous studies are used to demonstrate that Carrick’s method “could 
give results [two] to [sixty] times greater than the standard method.”254  
Likewise, when the same expert raised questions about the pollution 
impact of nonpoint sources, he offered evidence of phosphorus loadings 
from agriculture, new development construction activities, roadway run-
off, and streambank erosion, to demonstrate that more than half of the 
phosphorus load is from nonpoint sources.255  These arguments are not 
mere claims of insufficiency or scientific error, but alternative analyses 
alongside careful consideration of effect and magnitude. 
In the Wissahickon Creek TMDL controversy, one comment pointed 
out that the Wissahickon watershed is four times larger than the 
Ironworks Creek reference watershed, and that because the steeper slope 
in the reference watershed lessens the likelihood of streambank erosion, 
the EPA underpredicted the sediment load in Wissahickon Creek.256  In 
its response, the EPA acknowledged the problem and revised its estimate 
of streambank erosion.257  Another non-idealized argument, in the 
Borough of Lansdale’s comments on the Neshaminy Creek draft TMDL, 
pointed out that the intended seventeen percent reduction in point source 
phosphorus loading did not take into account the eleven percent 
reduction predicted from BMPs implemented in the stormwater program.  
In this instance, the EPA responded with a counterargument: stormwater 
phosphorus loads are delivered in wet weather events, while the “critical 
period for nuisance algal growth is during low flow conditions” (i.e., 
when there is no stormwater loading).258  Nevertheless, the Borough’s 
challenge was specific as to the alleged defect and impliedly identified a 
significant effect resulting from an alternative analysis. 
We also identified numerous non-idealized arguments in the notices 
of appeal filed with the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.  For 
example, the various dischargers that appealed the Neshaminy Creek 
TMDL identified inconsistencies between the first and second drafts of 
the TMDL (the first draft stated that point source dischargers of nutrients 
were adequately addressed and further reduction was unnecessary; the 
second draft imposed a nearly sixty percent reduction for phosphorus), 
questioned the method of subtracting water impediment releases and 
                                                          
 254. F.X. BROWNE, INC., supra note 103, at 3–4.  Browne offers a chart showing water 
chemistry variations in Mill Brook to illustrate the deficiencies of limited sampling, and gives 
examples of other algae studies with vastly more samples than Carrick used.  Id. at 4–5. 
 255. Id. at 17. 
 256. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 28, cmt. 35-24. 
 257. Id., response 35-24. 
 258. NESHAMINY CREEK COMMENTS/RESPONSES, supra note 152, at 9–10. 
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estimated groundwater/septic sources from recorded stream flow to 
determine point source discharge (because that “significantly 
overestimates the contribution of municipal point source discharges”), 
and used PaDEP’s own data to contradict the theory that nuisance algae 
growth is reducing dissolved oxygen in the creek.259 
Finally, most of the comments in opposition to the Delaware PCB 
TMDL were not idealized, including identification of the risk of false 
positives (due to background noise contributed by sampling and 
laboratory artifacts) in the EPA’s not yet EPA-approved draft test 
method to measure PCB concentration, and a challenge to the exclusion 
of nonpoint sources which demonstrated that “even if the point sources 
were allowed no discharge of PCBs at all, the resulting reductions would 
not lead to attainment of the standards in the [Delaware] River.”260  Such 
criticisms go beyond identification of errors (and implied uncertainty) to 
consider the effect of alternative analyses. 
B. The Presence and Effectiveness of Idealized Arguments 
On the basis of the categories we developed to identify arguments 
that reflect an idealized conception of science, we were able to confirm 
the somewhat frequent, but not voluminous, use of strategies that focus 
on uncertainty or insignificant errors as a basis to weaken or delay 
regulation.  Recalling the original categories that motivated this study, all 
of them seem to reflect demands for more certainty than can reasonably 
be expected in regulatory process: (1) manufacturing uncertainty by 
pointing out flaws and demanding more information prior to regulation; 
(2) deconstruction of regulatory analysis by highlighting areas of 
uncertainty; and (3) demanding sound science by requiring high levels of 
confidence before acting on a perceived problem.261  While we did not 
find very many examples of explicit idealizations—such as demands for 
complete certainty or objectivity (e.g., demanding disinterested 
research)—we did detect implicit idealizations where a demand for more 
certainty or additional data, in itself not an unreasonable demand, was 
not accompanied by an alternative analysis or consideration of the effect 
(and magnitude of the effect) of the alleged shortcoming. 
                                                          
 259. Notice of Appeal, Hatfield Twp. Mun. Auth., supra note 166, ¶¶ 25, 29, 53(a), (d). 
 260. Letter from Robert M. Matty, Jr., Manager of Envtl. Affairs, Exelon Power, to Lenka 
Berlin, EPA Region III (Oct. 21, 2003), at 5.  Furthermore, it was noted that the method is extremely 
sensitive, and while data validation is necessary, the TMDL does not address false positives.  Id. at 
5–6. 
 261. See supra Part I. 
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In the process of identifying idealized arguments, we also came to 
the conclusion that idealized arguments were rarely, if ever, effective in 
weakening or delaying a regulatory burden.  Two of the TMDLs we 
studied were withdrawn in part on the basis of an error in the scientific 
literature relied upon in establishing the TMDL—an error conceded by 
the authors of the study.  Otherwise, the EPA and PaDEP are confident 
enough in their models, assumptions, data, and results, even as they 
concede some errors and uncertainties, to respond negatively to (or to 
ignore) arguments that lack specificity, genuine alternative analyses, or 
demonstrations that such alternative analyses would have a substantial 
effect on the proposed regulation.262  Reasonable scientific arguments 
made at the Comment stage sometimes resulted in minor changes to the 
TMDL, but conclusory accusations of too few data, too much 
uncertainty, or general modeling or sampling shortcomings were met 
with curt responses.  In response to a comment that the draft of the 
Wissahickon Creek TMDL “is seriously flawed,” does not “reflect 
current science,” and is not “scientifically defensible,” the EPA’s 
statement that “the TMDL is based on scientifically valid data and 
procedures” and therefore “stands as is and will not be withdrawn or 
delayed” seems to exemplify the spirit of almost every response to such 
generalized arguments that we read.263  Most of the time the EPA and 
PaDEP are so aware of the limitations of their scientific analysis, as well 
as the ease with which dischargers identify minor errors and 
discrepancies, that these agencies are not moved by idealistic demands.  
Therefore, the ability of a stakeholder to delay or weaken regulation by 
idealized arguments is minimal.264 
Moreover, arguments that demand more data or more accurate 
analyses without considering the effect of more data or offering an 
alternative analysis can sometimes backfire.  When the Skippack Creek 
and Neshaminy Creek TMDLs were withdrawn, it was obvious that the 
revised TMDLs (to be issued in the near future) would be more stringent 
on dischargers.265  In our discussions with representatives and consultants 
for these dischargers, it was also obvious they were aware of this 
possible result.  This confirms the possibility that arguments that 
“successfully” (from a strategic prospective) cause a delay may actually 
                                                          
 262. See supra notes 116, 119, 121, 125, 127, 153–55 and accompanying text. 
 263. WISSAHICKON RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 146, at 19, cmt. 35-01, response 
35-01. 
 264. But see supra note 181. 
 265. See Status Report, Lower Salford Twp. Auth., supra note 102 (noting the “TMDL as 
written is likely not stringent enough to attain applicable water quality standards”). 
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result in stronger, more restrictive regulations.  However, there is also the 
possibility, acknowledged by a consultant, that the next TMDLs for 
Skippack Creek and Neshaminy Creek will also not be based on 
sufficient data and sound analytic models, such that the new TMDLs will 
also be withdrawn. 
Of course, appealing a TMDL issuance to the Environmental 
Hearing Board does cause a delay.  Although we identified idealized 
arguments in notices of appeal, any controversy over their validity would 
occur in the scheduled hearing, and, in any event, most of the arguments 
made in the notices of appeal in our study were not idealized.  However, 
the initial process of TMDL issuance—an informational meeting 
between regulators and stakeholders to review technical data, a draft 
TMDL sent out for public comment, a public meeting, publication of 
comments and responses, a final TMDL, and perhaps an appeal—
highlights the potential reasons why idealized arguments might be made.  
In our informal discussions with several attorneys who represent TMDL 
stakeholders, several local federal and state regulatory personnel, two 
consulting engineers, a developer who filed an appeal, and four 
university professors who specialize in regulatory science, we shared the 
results of our study and asked why idealized arguments are employed.  
Three distinct but related and completely unsurprising answers emerged: 
(1)  Given the complexity of the TMDL allocation, a stakeholder 
(working with counsel and consulting engineers) cannot realistically 
review, analyze, and propose modifications in a thirty-day comment 
period.  There is time for brief written comments and responses, but not 
for substantial negotiations with the agency.  Indeed, negotiations seem 
to take place after an appeal has been filed.  Therefore, many challenges 
are raised as placeholders, that is, as issues to which one can return at a 
later date.  If they are in retrospect exaggerated, unrealistic, or 
unreasonable, they can be bolstered or discarded. 
(2)  Closely related to the above, the period during which an appeal 
can be filed before the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board is 
also limited to thirty days after notice of the TMDL, which means parties 
make numerous arguments to preserve the right to raise them in the 
hearing or in later appeals to a federal court (if the EPA established the 
TMDL).266  Prior to the hearing, the science supporting the TMDL can be 
investigated further and arguments can be developed.  Moreover, under 
                                                          
 266. See Notice of Appeal, City of Philadelphia, supra note 111, ¶ 21 (appealing its NPDES 
permit in part because it was based on the Wissahickon TMDL: “the Appellant has filed this appeal, 
in part, to preserve its right to challenge the validity of the TMDL for the Wissahickon Creek in the 
future in federal court”). 
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the pressure of preparing for the hearing, and perhaps trying to avoid it, 
genuine negotiations can take place.  In our subject TMDL controversies, 
it was quite common for the parties to agree mutually on stay requests 
and to present regular status reports to the administrative law judge.  
Again, the role of idealized arguments may be to serve as placeholders. 
(3)  Finally, irrespective of the intention to study the TMDL more 
closely or file an appeal, there is sometimes a conviction that a rigorous, 
scientific challenge to the TMDL can be developed with additional time, 
including running different models, performing formal uncertainty 
analyses, collecting more data, and offering an alternative analysis.  An 
argument that might appear idealized is in fact an abstract for a more 
compelling, justifiable challenge to be developed.  Thus, for example, the 
Conestoga TMDL changed appreciably after appeals were filed.  One 
developer said his “team” was able to present solid evidence to convince 
PaDEP of several errors and shortcomings of its procedures; even though 
no changes to the TMDL were made during the comment phase, the 
TMDL was revised in response to the appeal.  The Neshaminy, 
Skippack, and Anacostia TMDLs were also changed considerably (from 
the “final” published form) during the appeals (and before the 
Neshaminy and Skippack nutrient, but not sediment, portions of the 
TMDL were withdrawn).  By contrast, the Wissahickon TMDL has not 
been changed, despite appeals.267  In all cases, the comment phase did 
not play any significant role in garnering revisions to the TMDL.  
Argumentative comments may serve as placeholders while the TMDL is 
analyzed, to preserve issues on appeal, to create an agenda for 
negotiations, or to lay the groundwork for a future robust scientific 
critique; idealized arguments, however, seem to have little effect on 
agency scientists, and little success except as place markers. 
C. The Problem(s) with TMDLs 
While we did not intend this study to provide specific insights for the 
ongoing policy disputes about the effectiveness of the TMDL program, 
the tensions between stakeholders who want better science—a view 
reflected in and supported by the NRC report—and those who 
acknowledge both the limitations of science and the need for immediate 
pollution abatement,268were especially evident in our subject TMDL 
                                                          
 267. There were apparently no discussions between PaDEP and the City of Philadelphia about 
technical objections to the TMDL, as the City was pursuing those issues with the EPA, which 
established the TMDL.  See supra note 111. 
 268. See supra notes 31–41 and accompanying text. 
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controversies.  From the latter perspective, the rush to create TMDLs is 
justified, but stakeholders have concerns that go beyond the problem of 
thirty-day comment periods and the thirty-day appeal period in 
Pennsylvania.  Most TMDLs use subjective margins of safety and lack 
the data necessary for formal uncertainty analyses.  That is why the 
stakeholders in our TMDL controversies identified missing variables or 
data shortage as fundamental flaws, and that is also why agencies 
responded that their selection of variables and their use of data is 
“appropriate.”  Everyone in the process knows the TMDL program 
would benefit from careful, quantitative uncertainty analyses, and that 
there would be less controversy (or at least a different, more scientific, 
controversy).  The agencies have a deadline, however, even as 
stakeholders find little reason to accept errors and uncertainties simply 
because of temporal constraints.  Those errors and uncertainties, from the 
stakeholders’ perspective, have adverse and expensive consequences. 
Another problem this study brings into relief is the artificial 
precision that is ubiquitous in the TMDL program.  A “total daily load” 
implies a level of precision that neither the models nor the field 
conditions can produce.  Insignificant omissions and errors can therefore 
easily be identified as “fundamental flaws”; agencies can never really 
justify with precision the figures the Clean Water Act requires they 
produce. 
Finally, run-off based TMDLs have been shown to be planning 
documents poorly linked to implementation.  This is the “fundamental 
disconnect” of the program; in concept, the federal government forces 
state governments to force municipal governments to force landowners 
to manage their land in a manner beneficial to the watershed.  But this is 
not happening due to financial concerns, legal controversies, scientific or 
technical shortcomings, and, primarily, political barriers.  Many of the 
benefits of implementing run-off based TMDLs would accrue in the 
future as habitat is restored and as downstream clean water flows in the 
watershed, the benefits of which are spread diffusely for the population.  
Costs, however, are immediate, local, and imposed on offending 
landowners.  Moreover, elimination or reduction of the offending 
behavior is difficult due to lifestyles and population growth.  This 
presents a losing formula for political action and explains much of the 
implementation inactivity.269 
                                                          
 269. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (8th prtg. 1971).  See generally David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source 
Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (1996) (explaining “why potentially effective alternative solutions—such as 
 
07-CAUDILL_FINAL 12/9/2008  10:05:26 AM 
310 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
D. Non-scientific Solutions 
[M]ore attention should be given to the political process.  Disputes 
should be understood and handled primarily as between people, only 
secondarily as between scientific theories . . .; and more attention 
should be given to negotiation and deliberation and less to proof.270 
In contemporary law and science discourse, “politics” is often 
contrasted with scientific expertise, with the former construed as 
potentially distorting, interfering with, or eclipsing the latter in the 
regulatory process.271  For example, in the context of regulation to reduce 
the effects of global warming, “there were suggestions of widespread 
tampering by the Bush Administration with the global warming data 
reported by numerous federal agencies,” including replacing (in an 
annual EPA report) language from a National Academy of Sciences 
Report (representing scientific consensus in climate change) with 
language from a study funded by the American Petroleum Institute that 
questioned climate change science.272  That discourse sometimes tends to 
idealize science’s capacity to avoid politics and interests as if “interest 
groups” are always associated with industry and not with so-called 
environmentalists.  Our point is that “politics” usually has pejorative 
connotations. 
Politics, however, can be seen as a solution to regulatory 
controversies when the science runs out,273 when “the supply of . . . 
scientific and technical information is far less than is needed to produce 
effective or comprehensive regulations . . . .”274  The TMDL program 
                                                                                                                       
pollution taxes on farmers, or command and control regulation—have not yet been implemented by 
Congress, and why a less effective solution may indeed pass”). 
 270. Alario & Brün, supra note 251. 
 271. See, e.g., RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) (fourteen essays concerning 
abuse of science by special interests). 
 272. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise 3–4 
(Aug. 2007) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008906.  The 
authors also discuss accusations of administration interference in regulation of agriculture and 
protection of endangered species.  Id. at 5. 
 273. See generally Alario & Brün, supra note 251.  Indeed, politics might even play a central 
role before “the science runs out”: 
We argue for acknowledgement of the political process, for formulating issues first as 
between people, and only later and with great caution as scientific or ethical.  That will 
avoid serious misunderstandings, for the general expectation is that scientific or ethical 
issues be resolved by proof or demonstration with reference to invoked or discovered 
standards; but issues are really resolved, or not, by negotiation—politics. 
Id. 
 274. Wendy E. Wagner, Stormy Regulation: The Problems that Result when Stormwater (and 
Other) Regulatory Programs Neglect to Account for Limitations in Scientific and Technical 
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was arguably mandated without an appreciation of “these severe 
information constraints, [and] by insisting that regulatory requirements 
be based on scientific models that are often badly data-deprived and 
laden with theoretical uncertainties, these programs encounter decades of 
contested science and resultant regulatory paralysis.”275  That sense of 
hopelessness leads some to suggest that water pollution abatement may 
best be handled at the local (municipal or county) level instead of 
through state and federal regulations.276  Even at the state level, however, 
we observed a preference for negotiated settlements to avoid litigation 
over scientific shortcomings. 
In the TMDL controversies we studied, two (Skippack and 
Neshaminy) were withdrawn but will soon be replaced and likely 
appealed to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.  The 
appeals in the Wissahickon, Delaware River (PCB), and Conestoga 
TMDLs were withdrawn, with the latter undergoing significant revisions 
during negotiations.  In the potential future litigation over the 
forthcoming Skippack and Neshaminy TMDLs, we do not foresee 
idealized arguments as having any significant effect, but there will be a 
sufficient number of non-idealized arguments to reinstate the policy 
controversy over TMDLs.  Do we delay the TMDL program until there 
is better science, as defined in the NRC report recommendations, or do 
we go forward with the best available science?  Both sides in that debate 
can accuse the other of having an “attitude”—an “agenda”—that 
interferes with their scientific evaluations.277 
V. CONCLUSION 
Just as everyone agrees environmental regulation should be based on 
“good science,” but do not agree on what that means, so everyone would 
likely agree unreasonable arguments have no place in regulatory 
scientific discourse.  But when is an argument unreasonable?  While 
there is no easy answer, in this study we attempted to identify 
                                                                                                                       
Information, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 191, 193 (2006). 
 275. Id. at 198; see also Andreen, supra note 21, at 539 n.13 (“The problem . . . is that the water 
quality standards approach has never worked . . . .  There has been too little stream quality data to 
support it, and too little political will . . . .”). 
 276. See Malone, supra note 17, at 11,141.  See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of 
Local Governments in Watershed Management, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,273, 11,273 (2002) (“Because 
watersheds do not respect political boundaries, effective watershed conservation will require 
cooperation and coordination among all levels of government, including local units.  Watershed 
conservation is one of the increasingly significant environmental protection roles local governments 
are playing for a variety of reasons, ranging from choice to coercion.”). 
 277. See supra note 35. 
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characteristics of unreasonable arguments, in the context of five TMDL 
controversies, by reviewing all of the scientific challenges and 
comparing those that were helpful or constructive with those that were 
not.  We concluded there was a form of argument, appearing frequently 
(but always alongside many more “reasonable” arguments), that was less 
than helpful: arguments that claimed threshold failures but did not offer 
thresholds; arguments that did not consider the effect of errors or 
uncertainties, or its magnitude; and arguments that offered criticism but 
no alternative. 
If there is a recommendation from this study that would be useful to 
attorneys representing stakeholders in the early stages of the TMDL 
process, it would be to avoid idealized arguments.  The potential to 
delay, weaken, or avoid regulation is minimal, as such arguments do not 
move agency scientists.  However, we recognize their utility as 
placeholders when environmental agencies move more quickly in 
regulating than stakeholders can in their critical evaluations.  Appeals 
cause delay, and most appeals include idealized arguments, even as those 
types of arguments rarely stand alone.  Moreover, it is not at all clear that 
attorneys (and their stakeholder clients) should be blamed for such 
delays—the urgent need for water quality regulation, the rushed process 
of establishing TMDLs, and the need for careful evaluation all combine 
to create a situation where an expensive appeal is the only available 
option. 
In the context of litigation, when a judge idealizes science, idealized 
arguments have a lot of potential success.  People listen if you idealize, 
and you get rejected if you openly acknowledge the inevitable limitations 
of science.  But environmental agency bureaucrats are pragmatists, well 
aware of the limitations of their models, data, and resources; they do not 
idealize TMDL science, and they do not respond well to idealizations. 
